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ARTICLE 
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 
AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS: 
THE CARROT AND THE STICK 
M. BENJAMIN EICHENBERG

 
 
―Some say the world will end in fire, 
Some say in ice. 
From what I‘ve tasted of desire 
I hold with those who favor fire. 
But if it had to perish twice, 
I think I know enough of hate 
To say that for destruction ice 
Is also great 
And would suffice.‖1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ben Eichenberg obtained his JD from UC Hastings in 2008 and has spent the last year as a 
Fulbright Fellow at the Law School of the University of Oslo, where he just finished his Master‟s 
degree in Public International Law—this Article originated as a Master‟s thesis for that program. In 
February of 2010, Ben will present this work at the Public Interest Environmental Law Conference 
in Eugene, Oregon. Ben would like to thank his thesis advisor, Christina Voigt, for her wisdom and 
guidance; his Norwegian family, the Steens, and Brook Steens for taking him in and making him 
welcome in their lives; his father, Tim Eichenberg, for the inspiration; Professor Rory Little for the 
thorough edit and comments; all of his Oslo friends; his son Leo for being; the Fulbright Foundation; 
the University of Oslo; and, most of all, his wife Susie Meserve without whom . . . 
 
1
 ROBERT FROST, FIRE AND ICE, reprinted in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST, at 220 
(Edward Lathem, ed., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1969) (1923). 
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Border Tax Adjustment (BTA): for imports, a BTA means a tax on 
goods entering domestic markets from abroad to balance tax burdens 
already imposed on domestic producers; for exports, a BTA means the 
remission of taxes usually imposed on domestic producers as a means of 
protecting the international competitiveness of such producers where 
their goods are solely destined for export to other counties. 
 
 
 
3
Eichenberg: Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:27 AM 
286 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 3 
I. INTRODUCTION: BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ANTHROPOGENIC GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
Global climate change due to the emission of anthropogenic, or 
manmade, greenhouse gases (GHGs) has the most widely dispersed costs 
of any transboundary environmental problem that the international 
community has yet faced. In other words, it is a global public problem 
and thus provides few incentives for unilateral or individual mitigation.
2
 
This makes finding solutions difficult because international coalitions 
must face the problem of free-riders who benefit from reduced GHG 
concentrations at zero cost
3—those who make the economically rational 
decision to let others reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations while they 
continue to build GHG-intensive economies. Free-riders contribute to a 
multitude of problems for international environmental agreements in 
general, and climate agreements in particular, by impacting the 
competitiveness of exports, raising equity issues between trading 
partners, and negatively affecting the overall effectiveness of 
environmental protection schemes generally and GHG emissions targets 
in particular. The basic incentives that encourage free-riding need to be 
addressed before global climate governance can become a reality. 
Finding and implementing economic solutions to the problems of 
global climate governance is one of the few efficient and effective 
problem-solving methodologies currently available. Economic power in 
general affects the positions of states in multilateral or bilateral 
environmental negotiations and can have a profound impact on the 
outcomes of such agreements, whereas military power rarely has much 
impact or influence on outcomes.
4
 Furthermore, much of the root causes 
of anthropogenic climate change occur as a result of economic 
development and markets that fail to properly encourage sustainable 
development—sustainable natural resource use is systematically 
 
 
2
 DAVID KERNOHAN & ENRICA DE CIAN, Trade, the Environment and Climate Change: 
Multilateral Versus Regional Agreements, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP 
APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 70, 75 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 
2007) (“Climate protection can be viewed as a global „public good‟ which means that there are few 
incentives for unilateral mitigation . . . Hence, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation 
requires a global-cooperative solution.”). 
 
3
 Id.  “Free-riders” are actors who “benefit from having cleaner air at zero cost.” Id. 
 
4
 For instance, “Japan and the Republic of Korea have accepted international agreements on 
drift-netting and whaling because they feared the loss of fishing benefits from the United States. And 
Japan succeeded in ensuring the support of some small nonwhaling nations for its prowhaling 
position by offering assistance to their fishing industries.” GARETH PORTER, JANET WELSH BROWN, 
& PAMELA S. CHASEK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11 (2000). 
4
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undervalued in modern market economies.
5
 Likewise, environmental 
services, restorative ecosystem functions like water purification and 
flood control in wetlands, are utilized in irresponsible and unsustainable 
ways because economic markets fail to properly value such services.
6
 
According to Porter, Brown & Chasek, 
One of the obstacles to effective international action for environmental 
conservation in the past has been a dominant social paradigm that 
justifies unlimited exploitation of nature. Despite the weakening of 
that paradigm and the apparent widespread recognition of an 
alternative sustainable development paradigm . . . the shift to this 
alternative social paradigm is far from complete. There are still some 
sectors of societies, particularly powerful political and economic 
institutions, where the traditional paradigm continues to exhibit 
extraordinary staying power.
7
 
It is only rational to address a solution through the same economic 
channels that caused anthropogenic climate change in the first place. 
Currently, most economies do not account for climate-change-
associated costs incurred by GHG emissions.
8
 Accounting for GHG 
emissions increases systemic economic efficiency by incorporating 
climate externalities and allowing market forces to perform regulatory 
functions, pushing economic actors to take into account the full costs of 
production.
9
 Methods to address climate externalities are being 
considered or implemented in various places around the world and 
include GHG allowances, GHG permit trading schemes, and 
environmental taxes. Some of these measures have been considered or 
implemented in order to fulfill international obligations incurred under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)
10
 and its accompanying Kyoto Protocol.
11
 Uncertainty about 
the future costs of such programs causes hesitation on the part of 
 
 
5
 Id. at 24. 
 
6
 Id. 
 
7
 Id. at 32. 
 
8
 Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way To Support 
Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. LAW ECON. 137, 141 (2007). 
 
9
 David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CANADIAN TAX J. 2063, 2069 (2003), 
available at www.ctf.ca/ctjindex/03ctj6.asp. 
 
10
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php [hereinafter  
UNFCCC]. 
 
11
 Kyoto Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
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regulators and instigates intensive lobbying by potentially affected 
industries, directly impacting the efficacy of GHG cost internalization 
measures.
12
 Countries that have begun Kyoto implementation are 
especially sensitive to disparities between their own GHG reduction 
commitments and the lack of such commitments from non-Kyoto 
signatories.
13
 Domestic businesses in many of the countries that have 
shown a commitment to reduce their GHG emissions are urging 
measures to ease competitive pressures from international competition 
with non-GHG regulated products.
14
 
One solution to such disparities in GHG reduction commitments is 
for GHG-regulating states to use Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) to 
protect domestic industries. BTAs in this context would tax imports to 
balance the costs faced by domestic producers for GHG regulations and 
would relieve exports of the costs of GHG-based domestic regulation. As 
pointed out by Gavin Goh, “[i]n the absence of harmonized domestic tax 
systems among trading partners, an objective of border tax adjustments is 
to ensure trade neutrality of domestic taxation and thereby preserve 
competitive equality between domestic and imported goods.”15 The most 
significant obstacles to the use of BTAs are typically posed by free-trade 
agreements—and by far the most relevant restrictions to the use of BTAs 
come from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Global 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
16,17
 The goal of this Article is 
to show not only that is there room for BTAs as a complement to 
domestic GHG regulation under the law of the WTO, but that BTAs are a 
necessary component in the construction of a system of global climate 
governance. 
BTAs are a common tool for governments interested in protecting 
domestic production from inexpensive imports.
18
 The importing country 
simply assesses a tax at the border on whatever product it believes is 
 
 
12
 Economic modeling shows clear negative efficiency impacts for a partially implemented 
GHG scheme. Duff, supra note 9, at 2069. 
 
13
 See THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC, 
LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008). 
 
14
 Id. 
 
15
 Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the 
Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395, 398 (2004). 
 
16
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55. U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
 
17
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 143; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 19, 
29 (stating that some developing countries have proposed border taxes, and finding “some evidence” 
of such taxes “having negative impacts on trade flows” and “export competitiveness”). 
 
18
 See, e.g., DUNCAN BRACK, MICHAEL GRUBB & CRAIG WINDRAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 76 (2000). 
6
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undercutting domestic producers, thereby evening out market 
disparities.
19
 Such adjustments work for exports as well—countries 
simply relax domestic taxes that would normally be applied if the taxed 
product were not destined for export. BTAs are usually limited to 
balancing indirect taxes (taxes applied either directly or indirectly to the 
product), as opposed to direct taxes, which are imposed directly on 
producers.
20
 BTAs for the costs of GHG regulation would be indirect 
taxes—for example, fossil fuels are already subject to this kind of BTA 
in many countries.
21
 On the other hand, BTAs related to production 
processes, such as pollution emissions, are quite rare.
22
 
The destination principle of international trade holds that taxes 
should be applied at a particular product‟s final destination in order to 
avoid the inequity of double taxation or no taxation at all. In theory, 
BTAs follow this principle by taxing goods in the country of 
consumption (taxes are on imports rather than exports), allowing each 
country to pursue its own internal taxation scheme while competition in 
international markets occurs on a level playing field. Under the 
destination principle, in other words, taxes should not follow exported 
goods.
23
 
Inexpensive imports can be the result of any number of market 
disparities, ranging from more advanced technology and production 
methods in the country of origin to higher labor costs in the importing 
country. Protectionism is the term used to describe measures designed to 
protect producers from such imports.
24
 Historically, protectionism served 
to prop up domestic industry for the time required to become competitive 
in international markets.
25
 However, protectionism also leads to conflict 
and economic inefficiency, and it is thus targeted for elimination by 
 
 
19
 Or even going so far as to disadvantage importers, thereby removing the import market in 
that product altogether—after all, the power to tax is the “power to destroy.” M‟Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819). 
 
20
 For example, social security taxes and payroll taxes would be considered direct taxes, 
while sales taxes, value added taxes, excise duties, and consumption taxes would be considered 
indirect taxes. See, e.g., Goh, supra note 15, at 399. 
 
21
 Id. (citing Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic/Fiscal 
Instruments: Taxation (i.e. Carbon/Energy), Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Working Paper No. 4, 83, OCDE/GD(97)188). 
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments Under GATT and EC Law 
and General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 6 (1994). 
 
24
 See Donald H. Regan, What Are Trade Agreements for? Conflicting Stories Told by 
Economists, with a Lesson for Lawyers, 9 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 951, 966 (2006). 
 
25
 Id. 
7
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numerous international agreements.
26
 
Domestic environmental regulation can create market disparities 
that favor imports from countries without such regulations. This opens 
up the realm of regulatory protectionist measures.
27
 Barriers to the entry 
of international producers into domestic markets are favored by both 
industry and environmentalists, meaning that political considerations 
often lead to the inclusion of such barriers despite their proven economic 
inefficiency when compared to other forms of environmental 
regulation.
28
 In addition to political pressures, the companies most likely 
to be impacted by increased international competition control or 
influence many of the most important indicators of injury, such as profit 
margins and employment data, and are more likely to adjust their 
behavior at the margin in the hope that the sacrifice of some marginal 
profits in the short term will lead to large rewards from increased 
protectionist profits in the long run.
29
 
BTAs for the costs of GHG regulations are intensely controversial 
because of sovereignty and equity concerns surrounding the imposition 
of environmental norms through coercive trade measures.
30
 Less-
developed countries tend to be tolerant of greater levels of pollution in 
their quest to develop their economies, and imposing one country‟s 
standards on another challenges the ability of the people of less-
developed states to make critical development decisions.
31
 As a result, 
there are no BTAs currently utilized by any regulatory or legislative 
 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 See Michael P. Leidy & Bernard M. Hoekman, ‗Cleaning Up‘ While Cleaning Up? 
Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies, 78 PUB. CHOICE 241, 248 
(1994). 
 
28
 Id. 
 
29
 Id. at 250. 
 
30
 Goh, supra note 15, at 399; Goh adds that “some countries consider that action cannot be 
delayed until international consensus is attained and that unilateral responses might be justified.” Id. 
at 400; Andrew Green lists potential constraints to sovereignty posed by the WTO in general: “(i) 
national treatment rules that limit the ability of states to introduce non-product related PPMs as well 
as, potentially, innocent regulatory distinctions; (ii) scientific evidence requirements to the extent 
they place hurdles in the path of states attempting to justify climate change action; and (iii) balancing 
rules that provide less deference to domestic regulatory decisions in the face of scientific 
uncertainty.” Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO, 8 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 
143, 187 (2005). 
 
31
 Dominic Gentile summarizes the argument thus: “[D]eveloping countries argue that many 
of the global environmental problems that currently exist have been created by the developed 
countries, not themselves. They thus, it is those countries contend it is those developed countries that 
should bear the greatest burden in their resolution.” Dominic A. Gentile, International Trade and the 
Environment: What is the Role of the WTO?, 19 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1975, 23027-228, 230 
(2009). 
8
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system of climate governance.
32
 Three of the primary complaints raised 
concerning BTAs for the costs of GHG regulation are (1) that an efficient 
methodology would be almost impossible to achieve, resulting in 
reduced economic efficiency, unreasonable transaction costs, and the 
potential for widespread systemic fraud;
33
 (2) that BTAs for greenhouse 
gases would not be in conformity with various international trade 
regimes that favor free trade, primarily those of GATT and the WTO;
34
 
and (3) that BTAs are politically destructive because of their association 
with protectionist trade policies and their potential to destroy delicate 
negotiations toward cooperation on GHG emissions reductions.
35
 These 
concerns will be covered in the sections to follow. 
A. A RELATIVELY BRIEF OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY THEORY AS IT 
RELATES TO CLIMATE ISSUES, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND BORDER 
TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
All of the world‟s economies produce GHGs to some extent, 
whether it is through automobiles, factories, energy generation, 
agriculture, or deforestation. With the increasing certainty of widespread 
destruction as a result of anthropogenic GHG production and resulting 
climate change, tensions worldwide are flaring over increasing demands 
for binding GHG emissions targets.
36
 Under the Kyoto Protocol, states 
with developing economies are generally not expected to achieve 
specific GHG emissions reductions. The theory this arrangement was 
based on, known as “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR), 
was developed under international environmental law as an equity 
principle to balance the burdens of environmental protection.
37
 
Practically speaking, this has meant that developed economies agreed to 
 
 
32
 Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J. 
INT‟L ECON. L. 749, 755 (2009). 
 
33
 See, e.g., Slayde Hawkins, Skirting Protectionism: A GHG-Based Trade Restriction Under 
the WTO, 20 GEO. INT‟L ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 429 (2008); ZhongXiang Zhang & Lucas Assunção, 
Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO, 27 THE WORLD ECONOMY 359, 380 (2004). 
 
34
 See, Goh, supra note 15. 
 
35
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 139-40. 
 
36
 For instance, at a recent meeting of the G8, developing countries and India in particular 
rejected calls for binding targets on emissions. Mark Landler, Meeting Shows U.S.-India Split on 
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/world/asia/ 
20diplo.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=india%20clinton&st=cse. 
 
37
 See UNFCCC, supra note 10, Preamble, Art. 3(1)(“The Parties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse effects thereof.”). 
9
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pay for the entire conversion to a low-carbon world economy. 
The agreement of developed countries to take on that responsibility 
was motivated by a number of important factors. Not only are developed 
and industrialized economies primarily responsible for anthropogenic 
atmospheric GHG concentrations—carbon takes approximately 100 
years to cycle out of the atmosphere
38—but these economies also have 
the ability to pay for climate-change mitigation and adaptation, while 
serious questions remain about whether developing countries have the 
ability to shoulder a more significant share of the costs than they have to 
date.
39
 Mitigation is the effort to reduce atmospheric GHG 
concentrations.
40
 Adaptation refers to efforts aimed at improving and 
protecting existing infrastructure under the assumption that certain 
climate-change impacts are unavoidable despite mitigation.
41
 
Under CBDR, everyone shares the responsibility to take climate 
change into account, but the responsibility is differentiated according to 
each country‟s ability to pay. Thus, under the Kyoto Protocol developing 
economies were encouraged to restrain increases in GHG emissions, but 
they were not required to set binding emissions limits. Under the system 
eventually developed, climate-change-related development aid was 
earmarked for developing economies. This aid took a number of different 
forms, with strong financial incentives for wealthier nations, listed in 
Annex I of the UNFCCC and assigned specific GHG reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol, to invest in low-carbon infrastructure in non-
Annex I countries. Kyoto‟s Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) 
even allow Annex I countries to meet their emissions targets by paying 
for low-carbon infrastructure enhancements in other countries. In 
essence, CDM is the carrot offered by the Kyoto Protocol to non-Annex I 
countries—if they play along with the agenda, there are significant 
 
 
38
 Dan Galpern, Climate Change 101: Urgency and Response, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191, 
198 (2008) (“A substantial share of any given emission burst of CO2 decays within a century. 
However, approximately one-third remains after 100 years, and nearly one-fifth lingers after 1000 
years. Accordingly, a significant share of current emissions will continue to warm the climate system 
for many centuries even if such emission levels are reduced in the near future.”). 
 
39
 Some of the rationales behind the need for developing economies to emit GHGs, and 
thereby grow their economies more quickly, will be covered in greater depth a little bit later. 
 
40
 UNFCCC supra note 10, Glossary of Climate Change Acronyms, available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php (mitigation is defined as “a human 
intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.  Examples include using 
fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching to solar 
energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forests and other 
“sinks” to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.”). 
 
41
 Id. (adaption is defined as “[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual 
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities.”). 
10
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investment options for Annex I countries. 
In a perfect world, such multilateral cooperation would be all that 
was required to accomplish international cooperation. The ideal solution 
is to simply sit everyone down and agree to a solution that equitably 
shares costs and benefits—conduct climate policy through negotiation 
rather than through unilateral measures. But the Kyoto Protocol has 
faced numerous problems, not the least of which was the initial refusal of 
significant Annex I countries like the United States and Australia to 
commit to binding GHG emissions targets. This poses serious legitimacy 
problems for the Kyoto climate regime and related emissions trading 
systems, because in order to be effective any system of climate 
governance must be binding upon the world‟s largest emitters. It also 
poses serious economic questions for Annex I Kyoto signatories. These 
countries face competitive disadvantages in international markets, 
because their economies are bearing the burden of GHG reductions while 
many of their competitors, like the United States and China, do nothing. 
With such market advantages comes the possibility of GHG-intensive 
industries moving to less-regulated countries—a process known as 
“carbon leakage.”42 Such competitiveness concerns are a major 
stumbling block for countries considering taxes on GHG producing 
activities. Moreover, questions about the legality of BTAs for these types 
of taxes under international law, and especially under the law of the 
WTO, could dissuade countries from adopting such taxes in the first 
place.
43
 
Indeed, concerns about competitiveness are some of the primary 
objections cited by the United States as the basis for its refusal to agree 
to binding emissions targets.
44
 A strong theme in climate discussions 
concerns competitiveness in international markets and the perception that 
GHG regulation results in a competitive disadvantage for domestic 
industry.
45
 GHG-based BTAs would address concerns about carbon 
leakage and concerns about competitive disadvantages and would lead to 
the introduction of more-effective domestic GHG regulations.
46
 
 
 
42
 Arjun Ponnambalam, U.S. Climate Change Legislation and the Use of GATT Article XX 
To Justify a ―Competitiveness Provision‖ in the Wake of Brazil—Tyres, 40 GEO. J. INT‟L L. 261, 264 
(2008). 
 
43
 See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 63 (“[E]xisting [GATT] rules probably need 
to be modified for an alternative, more environmentally friendly approach to the adjustment of 
environmental taxes to be fully implemented without harming the international competitiveness of 
industries or giving rise to trade disputes.”). 
 
44
 See Ponnambalam, supra note 42, at 264. 
 
45
 Hawkins, supra note 33. 
 
46
 See id. at 427-29; Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 360. 
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i. Domestic Regulatory Pressures and Trends and the Role That 
Border Tax Adjustments Could Play 
Energy production and other GHG-producing activities play a 
central role in all of the world‟s economies. The economic centrality of 
GHGs forces governments interested in reducing their emissions to make 
difficult policy choices.
47
 Domestic policy is often shaped by powerful 
economic interests, especially the types of interests tending to be most 
affected by environmental regulation. Reductions in expected profits 
result in strong opposition from these types of interests.
48
 Corporate, 
profit-driven entities tend to band together to form lobbying groups to 
influence representative governments. Some of the most effective 
lobbying groups are relatively small, due to the prohibitive cost of large-
scale group organizing.
49
 Therefore, legislation that results in a widely 
dispersed distribution of both costs and benefits, such as climate 
legislation, will be underrepresented in a legislative system where 
focused interest groups influence domestic legislators.
50
 Smaller industry 
groups are highly motivated by research showing that measures 
involving carbon taxes or energy efficiency standards, two prominent 
options for GHG regulation, have statistically significant negative 
impacts on trade flows and thus on competitiveness.
51
 For this reason, 
many of the smaller, more effective lobbying groups tend to oppose 
GHG regulation by accentuating specific economic concerns. 
One prominent concern among Annex I countries is the risk of 
GHG regulation driving domestic industry to relocate their GHG-
emitting activities, and the jobs that these activities create, to countries 
with less-stringent regulation while continuing to sell the same volume 
and type of product in domestic markets. As mentioned earlier, this 
process is known as “carbon leakage,” and because of the global impact 
of carbon emissions, regardless of where the source of the GHG 
emissions is located, such leakage represents a significant efficiency 
 
 
47
 PORTER, ET. AL., supra note 4, at 113. 
 
48
 Id. at 71. (“Corporations have worked to weaken several global environmental regimes, 
including ozone protection, climate change, whaling, the international toxic waste trade, and 
fisheries”). 
 
49
 See Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO‘s Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under 
Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT‟L ENVTL. L. & POL‟Y 117, 125 (2007). 
 
50
 Id. at 126.  Ghei points out the corollary as well: “[W]hen either the costs or benefits are 
only narrowly distributed, that is, a small group either bears most of the costs or garners most of the 
benefits, strong lobbying by that group will often increase the likelihood of passage of legislation 
that favors the interest group.” Id. 
 
51
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 27-9. 
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threat to domestic regulation aimed at climate change mitigation.
52
 In 
other words, mandated domestic reductions in GHG emissions would 
result in little or no net global reductions in GHG emissions under a 
worst-case leakage scenario. Some estimate that emissions reductions in 
developed countries could be negatively impacted by as much as twenty 
percent by increased emissions due to leakage in developing countries.
53
 
Actual evidence of such leakage is fairly limited—thus concerns may be 
more theoretical than real—but because the costs of GHG regulation are 
expected to be so much higher than anything currently in place, these 
concerns remain prominent in many domestic regulatory decisions. 
Disparities between the strength of GHG regulations also imply a 
threat to the competitiveness of developed economy industries.
54
 Lax 
domestic GHG regulation gives energy-intensive industries an artificial 
market advantage, because the global economy does not require such 
industries to pay for the negative externalities of climate change. As 
Paul-Erik Veel explains, “[a]lthough it remains desirable for those 
countries that are relatively most efficient at producing a particular good 
to produce it, the notion of efficiency necessarily needs to include those 
externalities which arise as a result of that production.”55 Again, actual 
evidence of competitiveness disparities is relatively limited, but concerns 
remain because of the high cost of anticipated GHG reductions. 
According to the World Bank, debate over the negative impacts of 
GHG regulation on energy-intensive sectors has “derailed any efforts in 
the United States to impose a carbon tax, or in the EU to institute a 
common framework on energy taxation.”56 Indeed, the political pressures 
brought by companies in the United States as a result of concerns about 
competiveness are one of the primary reasons why the United States 
refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol.
57
 Protectionist pressures lead Annex I 
countries to pursue GHG emission reductions in a manner that favors 
domestic over foreign producers.
58
 This leads to inefficient economic 
performance and ineffective regulatory regimes. Because of the manner 
in which climate regulation has evolved, a developing trend in 
discussions of greenhouse gas regulation involves so-called “bottom up” 
climate regimes.
59
 Bottom-up climate regimes involve regional and sub-
 
 
52
 Veel, supra note 32, at 751-2. 
 
53
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 30. 
 
54
 Id. at 30; see also Veel, supra note 32, at 752. 
 
55
 Id. at 753. 
 
56
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 24. 
 
57
 Veel, supra note 32, at 753. 
 
58
 See Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 360. 
 
59
 See, e.g., CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TOWARDS GLOBAL 
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regional negotiations and provide an alternative to what some view as the 
increasingly unlikely prospect of achieving a global climate agreement.
60
 
The result of these regulatory pressures and trends is a system in 
need of methods to accurately measure and then fairly balance the 
interests of domestic producers, international trade, and environmental 
effectiveness. Concerns about carbon leakage, for instance, could 
probably be adequately addressed by carbon tariffs or BTAs.
61
 BTAs, 
which rebate environmental taxes to companies upon export and add 
environmental taxes to imports, would significantly reduce pressures to 
provide tax exemptions or other efficiency inhibiting measures to 
domestic industry.
62
 Indeed, the three primary obstacles to domestic 
GHG regulation—carbon leakage, competitiveness concerns, and 
considerations of political economy—would be addressed by the 
imposition of complementary BTAs to whatever form of GHG regulation 
domestic legislators or regulators decide upon.
63
 
ii. GHG Taxes, Especially Carbon Taxes, and the Role That Border 
Tax Adjustment Could Play 
By and large, attempts to implement broad-based taxes on carbon 
dioxide emissions from all aspects of society in some of the world‟s most 
developed economies have failed.
64
 Such a carbon taxes would help 
correct for current climate externalities by raising the price of products 
that produce the main GHG, carbon dioxide. In spite of widespread 
failure to implement such taxes, the prevailing view among economists is 
that a carbon tax would be the most efficient and effective way to 
address anthropogenic climate change, especially as compared to certain 
types of energy taxes.
65
 A carbon tax would be efficient because it would 
allow the market to determine efficient carbon emission reductions 
without the overhead of a bureaucratic regulatory agency.
66
 
One prominent reason for failures to implement carbon taxes is the 
heavy impact such taxes are predicted to have on the competitiveness of 
energy-intensive products like steel and cement. In essence, such 
products will have a penalty assessed against them in the international 
 
AGREEMENT (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 2007). 
 
60
 Id. at 1-2. 
 
61
 Veel, supra note 32, at 1751. 
 
62
 Goh, supra note 15, at 400. 
 
63
 See Veel, supra note 32, at 751-52. 
 
64
 Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 376. 
 
65
 See id. 
 
66
 See id.; see generally Duff, supra note 9. 
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marketplace as compared with products produced in countries that do not 
levy such taxes.
67
 Levels for such taxes, especially where used as the 
primary means of GHG mitigation, are predicted to be high, although 
legal scholar David Duff points to studies in Sweden and Finland that 
show positive GHG reductions as a result of relatively modest GHG 
taxes.
68
 Even the few countries that have successfully implemented 
carbon taxes have so far either exempted energy-intensive industry or 
cycled the taxes back into industry-protective grants and subsidies.
69
 
Therefore, potential losers under a system of carbon taxes commit 
significant resources to defeating such measures, even threatening to 
relocate production facilities as a result of increasing energy costs. This 
action is taken in spite of increasing evidence that current differences in 
environmental standards are not a significant factor in international 
competitiveness or in the relative price levels for different products.
70
 
BTAs would allow regulators to apply a GHG-based tax to domestic 
producers without having to worry about adverse competitiveness effects 
because the penalty of higher energy costs would be removed. A BTA 
for carbon taxes applied to energy product imports and exports would be 
relatively straightforward under existing WTO rules, so long as there is 
no discrimination between like products, while a BTA on finished 
products would be more complicated.
71
 WTO methodology and 
compliance will be covered in depth later, when WTO rules applicable to 
BTAs are addressed. 
B. A RELATIVELY BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE EQUITABLE ISSUES 
UNDERLYING THE CLIMATE CRISIS 
A community standard or norm is emerging that says that 
reasonable reductions in GHG emitting activities are morally required.
72
 
World economic disparity in general presents stark equitable fallacies, 
and developing economies tend to be suspicious of environmental 
imperatives imposed by those not suffering a lack of basic human 
 
 
67
 Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 377. 
 
68
 Duff, supra note 9, at 2091; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 20 (“[A] carbon 
tax may significantly increase production costs, leading to lower profits, either through lower 
margins or through a reduction in sales (or both).”). 
 
69
 See Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 378; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, 
at 24. 
 
70
 Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 377-78; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, 
at 24 (noting that industries will migrate to other countries to avoid environmental taxes). 
 
71
 See Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 380. 
 
72
 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1599-
1600 (2008). 
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necessities such as security, health care, and nutrition.
73
 Trends in 
economic relations have not necessarily been getting better either. In 
1970 the richest twenty percent of the world‟s nations controlled seventy 
percent of the world‟s gross domestic product.74 By 1997 the richest 
twenty percent controlled eighty percent of the world‟s gross domestic 
product.
75
 Therefore, it is not difficult reach the conclusion that those 
who both caused the problem to begin with and are most able to pay for a 
solution should be the ones to do so. 
Environmental taxes in general are justified on moral grounds as 
furthering the “polluter pays” principle, found for example in Principle 
16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: “National 
authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost 
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.”76 This principle approaches 
environmental resources from the perspective that such resources are 
commonly owned, and environmental taxes are means to assert common 
ownership and allocate the costs of environmental damage to those 
responsible.
77
 
Another ethical rationale for environmental taxes, a transformative 
or educational rationale, has been suggested by Duff. Under this rationale 
environmental harms are viewed as consequences of economic 
development that can be minimized by changing attitudes and focusing 
attention on environmentally sensitive practices. Thus, the main purpose 
of environmental taxes, and by extension GHG-based BTAs, is “to 
encourage environmental awareness and shared responsibility for 
creating a better environmental future.”78 Thus, taxes and adjustments 
should target GHG-producing activity to the extent that doing so alters 
 
 
73
 See PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. One estimate states that basic health care and 
nutrition for everyone would cost approximately 13 billion dollars annually, four billion less than is 
spent on pet food in Europe and the United States. 
 
74
 Id. at 177. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16 (June 14, 1992),  
available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 
&l=en. There are many sources that cite and elucidate the “polluter pays” principle. The Rio 
Declaration is cited here as a representative and internationally accepted example. 
 
77
 Duff, supra note 9, at 2069. Duff criticizes the “polluter pays” principle as being 
“inappropriately individualistic,” pointing out that there are many segments of society that bear 
indirect responsibility for environmental degradation. Id. at 2077. 
 
78
 Id. at 2070. 
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established environmentally harmful attitudes and practices.
79
 
Climate regimes, regulatory structures that aim to mitigate the 
impact of climate change, and binding GHG emissions targets, raise 
particular equity issues relating to GHG emissions allocation strategies. 
An accurate measurement of stress on the global environment must take 
into account both population and consumption, and by any reasonable 
measure consumption is growing more quickly than population.
80
 
Nonetheless, “the world‟s leading emitters account for a strikingly large 
percentage of the world‟s emissions. Indeed, the United States and 
China, by themselves, are responsible for about forty percent of the 
world‟s total. Most of the world‟s nations, including many poor 
countries, are trivial contributors.”81 Furthermore, responsibility for 
anthropogenic climate change, and the suffering that will result, is 
disproportionately allocated between developed and developing 
economies. Some estimate that developed countries are responsible for as 
much as seventy percent of the GHGs in the atmosphere, while 
developing countries are responsible for only twenty-five percent and 
will suffer the most due to the locations of their population centers and 
their lack of resources to pay for costs related to adaptation to climate 
change.
82
 GHG emissions represent what is known in economics as a 
large-group externality problem, a problem caused by the actions of a 
large group that have consequences external to the causational group, 
because the impacts of climate change are not felt as strongly by those 
who primarily caused the problem
83—both because of the long life-cycle 
of carbon in the atmosphere (carbon currently causing climate change 
effects was emitted as much as 100 years ago) and because most of the 
largest emitting countries can afford to protect their populations from the 
worst impacts of climate change. 
Border tax adjustment schemes raise some specific equity issues 
when applied by wealthy nations to strengthen environmental regulation. 
Countries that do not implement satisfactory environmental and tax 
regimes could be disadvantaged through lower export revenue. Energy 
 
 
79
 Id. at 2072. 
 
80
 PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 2. 
 
81
 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a 
Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 59-60 (2009). 
 
82
 Heather D. Shumaker, The Economic Effects of the European Union Carbon Dioxide 
Emission Quota on the New Member States of the European Union: Can They Become Equal 
Economic Partners of the European Union While Complying with the 2008-2012 Quota?, 17 PENN. 
ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 110 (2008). 
 
83
 Andrew Green, You Can‘t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social 
Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 412-13 (2006). 
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resources are not evenly distributed in the world, and some deem it 
unfair that the countries that of necessity burn more coal than oil and gas 
are penalized.
84
 Additionally, there could be serious imperialistic 
overtones to a tax regime forcing poorer, raw-material-exporting 
countries to harmonize their internal tax structures with those of their 
primary export markets.
85
 BTAs for environmental purposes go beyond 
the achievement of domestic policy goals by demanding that other 
countries value environmental concerns over economic growth and thus 
impinge the sovereignty of foreign nations. 
Equity concerns such as these could play a significant role in 
international climate negotiations and have already forced the 
incorporation of equitable economic principles like “polluter pays” and 
CBDR into multilateral climate agreements. Historically, environmental 
protection in general and climate change prevention in particular have 
been seen as wealthy-economy agendas.
86
 Incorporated into these 
agendas, in the opinion of many developing economies, is the desire to 
obstruct the ability of less-wealthy nations to develop their economies 
and so maintain developed economic dominance over the world‟s natural 
resource wealth.
87
 To the extent that trust plays an important role in 
multilateral negotiations, BTAs could damage the potential for consensus 
approaches if developing countries regard environmental protections as 
imperialist or protectionist policy delivery tools.  After all, as explained 
earlier, BTAs have historically been used to do just this. This is one of 
the battles that the WTO will fight in its role as an arbiter of global free 
trade, and much rests on its ability to represent itself as an independent 
and objective source of law. 
C. THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
At the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference 
on the island of Bali in Indonesia, participating nations adopted the Bali 
Roadmap (also known as the Bali Action Plan) as the beginning of a 
two-year process toward finalizing a binding agreement in 2009 in 
Denmark. While international climate regimes like the Kyoto Protocol, 
instituted as a result of the UNFCCC, do not require parties to impose 
trade restrictions as a condition of compliance, various mitigation 
mechanisms unilaterally implemented could be viewed as inconsistent 
 
 
84
 Goh, supra note 15, at 421. 
 
85
 Id. 
 
86
 PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 178. 
 
87
 Id. at 179. 
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with WTO law where they have some impact on trade.
88
 While many call 
for changes to GATT that reflect environmental imperatives,
89
 the reality 
of international law is that new climate-change measures must take into 
account the structure and goals of the WTO.
90
 Article 3.5 of the 
UNFCCC states that “measures taken to combat climate change, 
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”91 
On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol, a result of the UNFCCC 
process, went into effect.
92
 The Kyoto Protocol attempts to address 
climate change through the UNFCCC principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), stating that “developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof.”93 Annex I countries are generally committed to reducing 
their GHG emissions to around five percent below 1990 levels by 2012, 
while non-Annex I countries have no specific targets.
94
 All signatories 
must report their GHG emissions levels and develop climate-change 
mitigation programs. The Kyoto Protocol does not dictate how GHG 
emissions reductions in Annex I countries are to occur, but rather 
establishes three “flexibility” mechanisms: (1) Joint Implementation, (2) 
the Clean Development Mechanism, and (3) Emissions Trading 
Systems.
95
 
 
 
88
 See Anita M. Halvorssen, UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the WTO—Brewing 
Conflicts or Are They Mutually Supportive?, 36 DENV. J. INT‟L L. & POL‟Y 369, 377 (2008). 
 
89
 See, e.g. id. at 370 (“Nicholas Stern projected that if action is not taken now, it may cost 5-
20% of global GDP each year from now to address climate change. . . . „Just as other financial 
institutions are addressing climate change, the World Trade Organization (WTO) needs to be 
working on how it can address climate change issues related to trade in a comprehensive manner.‟” 
(quoting Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate change, www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/Summary_of_Conclusions.pdf)). 
 
90
 There is “a general recognition by both regimes to respect the other‟s mandate.” THE 
WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 40; see e.g., CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A 
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLIMATE MEASURES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
 
91
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, Art. 3(5), May 9, 1992, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_ 
background /convention/background/items/2853.php. 
 
92
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 2. 
 
93
 UNFCCC, supra note 10, Art. 3 ¶ 1. 
 
94
 Kyoto Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 
III ¶¶ 1-3, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. (outlining 
responsibilities of Annex I countries); see also Kyoto Protocol, Essential Background, at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
 
95
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 2; see also UNFCCC, supra note 10, The 
Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
mechanisms/items/1673.php. 
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The GHG trading systems set up under the auspices of the Kyoto 
protocol, including the European Union Emissions Trading System, are 
projected to amount to a one-trillion-dollar market in emissions 
allowances by 2012—in other words, the largest single economic sector 
on earth. The goals set in Kyoto have both hard and soft law impacts, 
with targets and guidelines being adopted in practice even by non-
signatories. However, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol leaves specific 
implementation strategies up to individual signatories passes 
responsibility to the WTO—through regulations concerning subsidies, 
BTAs, technical specifications and requirements, governmental 
procurement, and taxes—to govern the options countries have to fulfill 
their Kyoto obligations.
96
 This is problematic because the WTO was 
created solely to facilitate free trade and is not always well-equipped to 
handle trans-boundary environmental disputes. 
The Kyoto Protocol itself, though billed as an attempt at global 
climate governance, could perhaps be more readily described as a sub-
global agreement. The continued refusal of major GHG emitters like the 
United States and China to commit to binding emissions targets 
contributes to this perception and draws into question the legitimacy of 
claims that the Kyoto Protocol is a global agreement. 
D. DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: WHY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NEED 
TO EMIT CARBON AND THE PRESSING NEED TO ADDRESS GHG 
OUTPUT FROM DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
Due to growth in population and gross domestic product, the 
majority of GHG emissions in the future will come from developing 
countries.
97
 Developing countries are following the same carbon-
intensive development path mapped out by the developed economies of 
the world. Currently, eighty percent of the world‟s population resides in 
developing countries that consume a little more than one third of the 
world‟s energy.98 Seventy percent or more of global GHG emissions 
increases from 2020 to 2030 are projected to come from non-Annex I 
countries, with China alone contributing nearly twenty-five percent of 
that expected increase.
99
 China‟s emissions have already overtaken those 
of the United States, based in large part on a strong dependence on 
 
 
96
 See Kernohan & De Cian, supra note 2, at 75. 
 
97
 Shumaker, supra note 82, at 110. 
 
98
 PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
 
99
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 46. 
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coal.
100
 Indeed, current GHG emissions reductions in developed 
countries are likely to be more than offset by emissions increases from 
developing countries.
101
 
In addition to the need to catch up to the higher standards of living 
in more-developed economies—an imperative that is generally perceived 
to require ever-increasing carbon emissions—developing countries often 
regard the imposition of environmental standards on trade with 
suspicion. China, for instance, prioritizes economic growth over 
environmental concerns, especially when the goal is to prevent premature 
death from easily preventable causes like infant mortality and inadequate 
sanitation.
102
 Environmental measures and protectionist interests that 
seek to exclude international competition from the domestic markets of 
wealthier nations often go hand-in-hand due to industry lobbying 
pressures and the apathy of environmental interests toward an optimal 
economic solution at the cost of environmental certainty.
103
 
Worldwide GHG regulatory efforts must take into account 
developing economies to a much greater extent than has so far been the 
case. By about 2030, fifty percent or more of global purchasing power 
will reside in developing economies.
104
 Additionally, GHG emissions 
estimates project that sometime between 2020 and 2030 developing 
countries will pass developed countries in GHG emissions from energy 
use.
105
 
Many developing countries oppose the imposition of carbon tariffs 
or BTAs because they believe that GHG regulation will slow economic 
growth. One avenue for this opposition is the WTO—China, for instance, 
believes that BTAs and carbon tariffs would violate WTO rules.
106
 The 
realities of development economics and the perceived need for increasing 
carbon emissions in developing economies means that any GHG-based 
border measure will almost certainly result in a WTO challenge. 
II. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
originally enacted in 1947 as a part of sweeping international legal 
 
 
100
 Id. at 46-47. 
 
101
 Id. at 47. 
 
102
 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1582. 
 
103
 See Ghei, supra note 49, at 131-32. 
 
104
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 3. 
 
105
 Id. 
 
106
 Veel, supra note 32, at 750. 
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reforms instigated as a response to the Second World War. Nothing in 
GATT addresses, or was intended to address, many of the environmental 
concerns that so urgently demand the attention of the WTO today. GATT 
was originally intended to establish a system of international trade 
regulation through an International Trade Organization as a means to 
peaceably settle trade disputes. But such a regulatory body did not 
materialize, and GATT became a set of ad hoc guidelines for nations to 
resolve trade policy disputes—ad hoc because there was no enforcement 
mechanism. 
Into this void stepped the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Created in 1994 by the Marrakesh Agreement, the WTO has real 
enforcement powers based on the suspension of trade advantages secured 
under the Agreement. As of July 23, 2008, 158 countries are members of 
GATT.
107
 The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement made 1947 GATT rules 
binding on all signatories, incorporating the basic structure of the 
original agreement as its foundation.
108
 Essentially, this structure is 
founded on three principles: (1) the Most Favored Nation Principle, (2) 
the National Treatment Principle, and (3) the general elimination of 
quantitative restrictions.
109
 These are collectively known as the 
substantive portions of GATT. 
The Most Favored Nation Principle contained in Article I of GATT 
states simply that an importing country must treat all members of the 
WTO equally, as most-favored nations.
110
 In other words, all products 
imported from member states must be treated the same regardless of their 
country of origin. For instance, the United States cannot place a special 
tariff on all products imported from France without also placing that 
tariff on all products imported from every member state. 
The National Treatment Principle contained in the first paragraph of 
 
 
107
 World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, available at www.wto.org/ 
english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
 
108
 Throughout this Article I will refer to the provisions of GATT 1947 with the 
understanding that these same provisions appear in GATT 1994, unless otherwise noted.  GATT 
1994 must be read with GATT 1947. 
 
109
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. I (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment), Art. III (National 
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Art. XI (General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions). 
 
110
 Id. Art. I ¶ 1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect 
to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”). 
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GATT Article III states that all similar products must be treated the 
same, whether they are produced domestically or on foreign soil.
111
 The 
purpose of this restriction is to protect the equality of competitive 
conditions by ensuring that protective domestic measures are not applied 
to domestic production.
112
 Thus, GATT expressly warns in the second 
paragraph of Article III against applying unequal treatment “so as to 
afford protection to domestic production.”113 Read together, the first and 
second paragraphs of Article III show that parties to GATT may apply 
charges to imported products, so long as those charges do not exceed 
charges already applied to domestically produced products.
114
 A 
violation of the National Treatment Principle occurs when taxes on 
imported products are in excess of those on like domestic products.
115
 
Finally, GATT‟s underlying trade liberalization principles are 
reflected in the rule that quantitative restrictions on trade, or quotas, will 
be gradually eliminated over an indeterminate length of time. Rules 
addressing quantitative restrictions and prohibitions are generally set out 
in GATT Article XI.
116
 GATT Article II requires member states to set 
maximum tariff levels.
117
 As a corollary, countries are not allowed to 
 
 
111
 Id. Art. III ¶ 1-2. The National Treatment Principle states that: “[t]he contracting parties 
recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, 
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified 
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production.” Id. at ¶ 1. Additionally, “[t]he products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, 
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those 
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.  Moreover, no contracting party shall 
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner 
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.” Id. at ¶ 2. 
 
112
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 97, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
113
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. III ¶ 1. 
 
114
 Id. at ¶¶ 1-2. 
 
115
 Goh, supra note 15, at 401-2. 
 
116
 See Gentile, supra note 31, at 203 (“Article XI for the most part forbids the use, by a 
member country, of quantitative restrictions and prohibitions.”). 
 
117
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. II ¶ 1(a)-(c) (“(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the 
commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the 
appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. (b) The products described 
in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are the products of territories of 
other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, 
and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from 
ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be 
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the 
importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and 
mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on 
23
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subsidize most forms of exports.
118
 Under this principle, the only 
permissible restrictions on trade would come to be duties, taxes, or other 
charges.
119
 
These three principles further the WTO‟s philosophy of “ensuring a 
certain trade neutrality.”120 They also reflect the ideology of the WTO by 
encouraging the functioning of free-market principles in order to both 
prevent conflict and help establish an optimal international trading 
system. While these principles were not designed to limit the ability of 
states to set their own levels of environmental protection, the application 
of GATT rules tends to create effective limitations to domestic 
environmental agendas.
121
 
Although GATT contained few environmental principles, the WTO 
has adopted a theoretical approach to climate change based on its stated 
goal to improve the welfare of the world‟s population by raising overall 
standards of living.
122
 Standards of living are to be raised by expanding 
trade while respecting the restraints of limited resources and the principle 
 
that date. (c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party 
which are the products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment upon 
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation into such 
territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt 
from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part II of that Schedule. 
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those 
directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing 
territory on that date. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from maintaining its 
requirements existing on the date of this Agreement as to the eligibility of goods for entry at 
preferential rates of duty.”). 
 
118
 Id. Art. XVI ¶ 4 (“Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date 
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on 
the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such 
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers 
in the domestic market.  Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any 
such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the 
extension of existing, subsidies.”). 
 
119
 See id. at Art. XI ¶ 1 (“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall 
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party.”). 
 
120
 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 9, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. 
 
121
 See Gentile, supra note 31, at 202. 
 
122
 See Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 375 (“The goal of the WTO is to improve the welfare of 
peoples by, among other things, „raising their standard of living‟ and „expanding the production of 
trade in goods and services, while allowing for optimal use of the world‟s resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development seeking both to protect and preserve the environment 
and to enhance the means for doing so . . . .”). 
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of sustainable development.
123
 Indeed, “most countries that are more 
open to trade adopt cleaner technologies more quickly, and increased real 
income is often associated with increased demand for environmental 
quality.”124 The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, after specifically 
mentioning sustainable development, states that signatories to the 
agreement seek “both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their 
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development.”125 The long-term effects of climate change will render 
these goals hollow window dressing if the WTO cannot adapt to the 
challenges posed to the world economic system by the dangers of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
126
 In the 
end, the goals of the climate treaties and the goals of the WTO are the 
same, to promote the overall welfare of all human beings.
127
 
Aside from GATT, there are some additional agreements (called 
“multilateral trade agreements” in the Marrakesh Agreement128) under 
the umbrella of the WTO that could impact the use of BTAs as a tool to 
balance domestic climate-change regulation. The Marrakesh Agreement 
states that, in cases of conflict with GATT, the provisions of these 
secondary, multilateral trade agreements will take precedence.
129
 In 
1994, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) was signed by the 128 original WTO signatories in order to 
further define trade-distorting subsidies and associated 
 
 
123
 Id. at 375. 
 
124
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 9. 
 
125
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
 
126
 Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 375. 
 
127
 Id. at 379. 
 
128
 The agreements listed in Annex 1A are the Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Agreement on Rules of Origin, Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on 
Safeguards. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
 
129
 Id. at Art. XVI(3) (“Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of 
subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or 
indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its 
territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares 
of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and 
any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product.”). 
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countermeasures.
130
 The SCM Agreement provides that “the exemption 
of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product 
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties 
or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not 
be deemed to be a subsidy.”131 This agreement also provides an 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies that reinforce the distinction between 
direct and indirect taxes (addressed in more depth in following 
sections).
132
 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), 
also added in 1994, was instituted to ensure that technical regulations and 
product standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.
133
 Technical regulations are defined as documents that define 
“product characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory.”134 This definition could easily include 
processes and production methods (PPMs) related to environmental 
conservation and energy usage.
135
 The preamble to the TBT Agreement 
looks very similar to the chapeau of Article XX—a set of clauses that 
allow exceptions to the rest of GATT for certain enumerated reasons—
with similar anti-discrimination language,
136
 and it imposes an obligation 
on states to use the least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available to 
accomplish policy goals.
137
 This requirement may imply a necessity test 
even broader than that required under GATT,
138
 as will be discussed in 
 
 
130
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994), available at 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#tbt, [hereinafter SCM Agreement]; see also 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 33 ILM 1125 (Sept. 1994) (including SCM Agreement as 
part of GATT). 
 
131
 Id. at Art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) n.1; see also Gentile, supra note 31, at 204. 
 
132
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 13. 
 
133
 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#tbt [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; see also General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs, 33 ILM 1125 (Sept. 1994) (including TBT Agreement as part of GATT). 
 
134
 TBT Agreement, supra note 133, Annex 1(1). 
 
135
 See Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the Environment: Moving 
Towards Consistency, 10 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 285, 300 (2007). 
 
136
 The preamble to the TBT Agreement states, in relevant part, that  
no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its 
exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or 
for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the 
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
or a disguised restriction on international trade . . .  
See also Green, supra note 30, at 154. 
 
137
 See TBT Agreement, supra note 133, Preamble (quoted above in note 136). 
 
138
 Green, supra note 30, at 147-48. 
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greater depth a little bit later on. However, because the TBT Agreement 
does not specifically address taxes and import duties, but is rather aimed 
primarily at mandatory technical standards, it is unlikely to have a direct 
impact on BTAs. 
A. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Disputes between GATT member states before 1994 were decided 
by non-binding GATT Panels, while those decided after 1994 are first 
heard by a WTO Panel, with the possibility of appeal to the Appellate 
Body. Under the terms of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, these 
decisions become binding once adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB).
139
 Such adoption is automatic unless the DSB is notified of a 
party‟s intent to appeal a Panel decision to the Appellate Body or unless 
there is a consensus vote against adoption by the WTO members voting 
in the DSB.
140
 It is important to note that there have been some decisions 
that have not been adopted by the DSB, and that the status of these 
decisions can be more properly thought of as somewhat persuasive, if 
they have any impact at all, whereas decisions approved by the DSB tend 
to be more akin to binding precedent. 
The DSB keeps “under surveillance the implementation of adopted 
recommendations or rulings,” and states are required to furnish status 
reports concerning compliance.
141
 States may request “[c]ompensation 
and the suspension of concessions or other obligations” if an adopted 
decision is not complied with in a reasonable period of time.
142
 
Ultimately, a decision adopted by the DSB could grant the plaintiff state 
permission to impose trade sanctions on the defendant state until the 
infraction is remedied.
143
 Therefore, it should be evident that GATT 
infringements can be quite costly to offending states. Because of this, the 
enforcement regime of the WTO has been one of the most effective 
international courts in the world, and its decisions tend to be reliably 
 
 
139
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article II, 
(1994) [hereinafter DSU]; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.;see also Jasper L. 
Ozbirn, An Analysis and Synthesis of the Decisional Law Applying Article XX(g) of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 371, 373 (2008). 
 
140
 DSU, supra note 139, Art. 16 ¶ 4. 
 
141
 Id. Art. 21 ¶ 6. 
 
142
 Id. Art. 22 ¶ 1. 
 
143
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 143. 
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adhered to.
144
 
Before 1994, GATT panels issued several relevant opinions 
concerning Article XX exceptions, including Canadian Tuna,
145
 
Canada—Herring and Salmon,146 Tuna—Dolphin I,147 and Tuna—
Dolphin II.
148
 Though these opinions did not occur under the auspices of 
 
 
144
 See Colm Patrick McInerney, From Shrimps and Dolphins to Retreaded Tyres: an 
Overview of the World Trade Organization Disputes, Discussing Exceptions to Trading Rules, 22 
N.Y. INT‟L L. REV. 153, 158 (2009). 
 
145
 Report of the Panel, United States – Prohibition of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, 
L/5198 - 29S/91 (Feb. 22, 1982), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ustuna.pdf.  
Canadian Tuna addressed an import restriction issued by the United States in response to seizures of 
its fishing fleets and arrests of American fishermen in Canadian waters.  The United States claimed 
its trestrictions were justified under U.N. law and therefore justified under Article XX(g).  Id. at ¶ 
3.7-3.10. The panel found that the chapeau of Article XX was probably met because it was possible 
that the discrimination by the United States was not arbitrary or unjustifiable, and that because the 
measures had been publically announced they were not disguised restrictions. Id. The panel found 
that the United States had not satisfied Article XX(g)‟s requirement that measures be made in 
conjunction with domestic restrictions.  Id. 
 
146
 Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and 
Salmon, L/6268 - 35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ 
canadaherring.pdf. This case challenged a Canadian export restriction on unprocessed herring and 
salmon, which Canada defended using Article XX(g) under the premise that Canada was trying to 
preserve fish stocks.  The Panel concluded that the measure was not primarily aimed at conservation, 
but was instead aimed at protecting Canadian fish processing infrastructure and jobs, thus not 
qualifying for an XX(g) exception. See Orzbirn, supra note 139, at 376; see also Ghei, supra note 
49, at 135-36. 
 
147
 Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39S/155 
(Sept. 3, 1991), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinI.pdf.  This case 
was initiated by Mexico in response to United States tuna import restrictions based in part on a 
requirement of compliance with United States regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA), which sought to reduce incidental killing of dolphins by commercial tuna fishing. Id. at ¶ 
2.3. The U.S. thus prohibited the import of yellow-fin tuna harvested with purse-seine nets unless the 
government with jurisdiction over the fishing operation had in place a program comparable to the 
MMPA and the average number of dolphins killed was comparable with the American fishing fleet. 
Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 377. The GATT Panel agreed that MMPA rules violated Article XI and 
adopted the argument that there was a jurisdictional limit on Article XX(g) that “was intended to 
permit contracting parties to take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions 
on production or consumption within their jurisdiction.” United States—Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, ¶ 5.31, DS21/R - 39S/155. The Panel also found that MMPA rules were too unpredictable 
because the Mexican government would be unable to predict from year to year whether its program 
was in compliance with the MMPA. The Panel gave no substantial rationale based in the language of 
Article XX(g) or on GATT precedent for the conclusion that member states were not free to impose 
restrictions extraterritorially under an Article XX(g) exception, but this limitation has not 
subsequently been addressed by any other GATT or WTO decisional body, “which suggests that it 
probably no longer applies.” Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 379.  Additionally, Tuna—Dolphin II rejects 
Tuna—Dolphin I‟s extraterritorial rationale. 
 
148
 Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 
1994), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf.  The last case 
decided by a GATT Panel before the implementation of WTO provisions in 1994, was a combined 
challenge by the European Economic Community and The Netherlands of an intermediary country 
embargo enacted by the United States under a revised version of the MMPA. Again, Tuna-Dolphin 
28
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the WTO and therefore lacked the enforcement mechanisms of the DSB, 
they have often been cited as precedent and should probably be 
considered persuasive, though not binding. Of additional interest is the 
impact that these decisions had in establishing the perception that the 
GATT panels exhibited an anti-environment bias. This perceived bias 
galvanized environmental organizations and protests around the world 
and may have pushed future WTO decisions in a more environmentally 
friendly direction. Now, there is some evidence of a shift from an older, 
pro-trade mentality to a more balanced approach that incorporates 
competing interests and views Article XX exceptions on an equal footing 
with the other, “substantive” provisions of GATT.149 
B. BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE LAW OF THE WTO 
A BTA aimed at balancing the costs to domestic industry of GHG 
regulation would be considered a policy that restricts trade, because it 
limits international access to domestic markets and so must comply with 
the general provisions of GATT.
150
 These provisions include the 
principles of nondiscrimination contained in the National Treatment and 
Most Favored Nation provisions of Articles I and III. There are, 
however, exceptions to these Articles, contained in Article XX, that 
would allow discrimination under certain prescribed circumstances. 
According to the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments, citing to the definition applied by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), BTAs are defined 
 
II hinged on whether MMPA rules qualified for an Article XX(g) exception. The Panel found 
explicitly that “a policy to conserve dolphins was a policy to conserve an exhaustible natural 
resource,” Id. at ¶ 5.13. The Panel also found that Article XX(g) exceptions could apply extra-
jurisdictionally; the Panel concluded however, that the embargo was not related to conservation 
because it was based on pressuring foreign governments into satisfying United States‟ conservation 
goals of the United States. Id. at ¶ 5.24. 
The panel also addressed process and production methods by stating that it was illegal under 
GATT to discriminate between domestic and foreign- like products based on production methods. 
See Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376. Perhaps this case stands for the proposition that a measure 
cannot be primarily aimed at conservation if another country must change its law or policies in order 
to attain the conservation objective aimed at. See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 380. It is important to 
remember, however, that the two Tuna—Dolphin decisions were never adopted by the parties, or by 
the GATT General Council, and that they do not have the status of a legal interpretation of GATT 
law. See, e.g., the disclaimer at the top of the WTO‟s home page for the cases, available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm. As future cases will show, trade measures 
aimed at coercing other countries into policy shifts have qualified as aimed at an appropriate 
conservation purpose. 
 
149
 See McInerney, supra note 144, at 197-98. 
 
150
 See Hawkins, supra note 33, at 431. 
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as any fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the 
destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be 
relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in 
respect of similar domestic products sold to consumers on the home 
market and which enable imported products sold to consumers to be 
charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country in 
respect of similar domestic products).
151
 
In general, the Working Party in 1970 expressed its satisfaction with the 
overall trade neutrality of BTA rules and declined to recommend 
changes.
152
 
For purposes of WTO law, BTAs should be treated as two separate 
regulatory regimes—one for exports and one for imports.153 The 
Working Party pointed to GATT Articles II and III as particularly 
important with respect to imports and GATT Article XVI as important to 
exports.
154
 Specifically, GATT Article II:2 says that, in spite of basic 
levels of customs duties established in Article II generally, states can 
apply “a charge equivalent to an internal tax,” or, in other words, a BTA, 
on the importation of any product.
155
 Article III says that measures 
affecting international commerce cannot be applied so as to protect 
domestic production by discriminating against imported products.
156
 
GATT Article XVI expresses general disapproval for subsidies—
especially where they have harmful repercussions for GATT members—
 
 
151
 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 4, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. The Working Party also stated 
that the term “border tax adjustment” could be confusing and should instead be referred to as “tax 
adjustments applied to goods entering into international trade.” Id. at ¶ 5. 
 
152
 Id. at ¶ 9. 
 
153
 See id. at  ¶ 7; see also OLE KRISTIAN FAUCHALD, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND TRADE 
DISCRIMINATION (1998). 
 
154
 Supra note 151, ¶ 7, L/3464. 
 
155
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. II ¶ 2(a). 
 
156
 Id. Art. III ¶¶ 1-4 (¶¶  1-2 appear supra, note 111; ¶¶ 3-4 read “3. With respect to any 
existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 2, but which is 
specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on April 10, 1947, in which the import duty 
on the taxed product is bound against increase, the contracting party imposing the tax shall be free to 
postpone the application of the provisions of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain 
release from the obligations of such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such duty to 
the extent necessary to compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax. 4. The 
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent 
the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.”). 
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and instructs signatories to avoid the use of subsidies where possible.
157
 
In Japan—Alcohol, Japan‟s unequal taxation of shochu and vodka 
was challenged as a violation of Article III(2). The WTO Appellate 
Body, the highest decisional body countries can appeal WTO cases to, 
concluded that 
[r]ead in their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose 
of the WTO Agreement . . . the words of the first sentence require an 
examination of the conformity of an internal tax measure with Article 
III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and domestic 
products are “like” and, second, whether the taxes applied to the 
imported products are “in excess of” those applied to the like domestic 
products. If the imported and domestic products are “like products”, 
and if the taxes applied to the imported products are “in excess of” 
those applied to the like domestic products, then the measure is 
inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence.
158
 
It is important to note that there is nothing in Article III that requires 
importing countries to take the level of taxes applied domestically in the 
exporting country into account, as this would be inconsistent with the 
destination principle. 
GATT Article III:1“informs Article III:2, second sentence, through 
specific reference . . . [and] states that internal taxes and other internal 
charges „should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production.‟”159 According to Goh, the 
regulatory purpose and the intent of the measure or measures in question 
are therefore relevant to an examination under Article III(2). One of the 
dangers of affording such protection to domestic production is a double 
tax penalty where producers have already paid energy taxes at home, 
which could jeopardize competitive neutrality.
160
 This would not be the 
case, however, if all countries followed the destination principle upon 
which the WTO is predicated. 
The following sections will address the specifics of BTA import and 
export issues. 
 
 
157
 Id. Art. XVI ¶ 1. 
 
158
 Japan—Alcohol: Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 11, 1996 
WL 910779 (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 
159
 Id. at 14. 
 
160
 Goh, supra note 15, at 411-12. 
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i. BTAs for Exported Products 
GATT Article XVI:4 prohibits a subsidy for a product where the 
subsidy “results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower 
than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the 
domestic market.”161 Prohibited subsidies allow countervailing duties to 
be levied by the importing state up to the level of the prohibited subsidy 
under GATT Article VI:3. Specifically allowing BTAs for exports, 
Article VI:4 provides that such countervailing duties cannot be levied as 
a result of the exemption of exported products from taxes (or the refund 
of such taxes) on like products destined for domestic consumption in the 
country of origin.
162
 
Article VI:4 of GATT makes it clear that exported products can be 
freed from domestic taxes through a BTA mechanism.
163
 This principle 
tends to hold true in both GATT and European Community rules, where 
taxes on products, or indirect taxes, are usually eligible for adjustment, 
while taxes on producers, or direct taxes, are not.
164
 This makes BTAs 
for exported products a relatively simple proposition for governments to 
institute with the assurance that they are not going to run afoul of WTO 
subsidy law.
165
 These types of tax adjustments—remissions, really—do 
not qualify as subsidies at all.
166
 
Domestic GHG regulations tend to address product inputs as well as 
final products, somewhat complicating the export BTA picture. The 
SCM Agreement permits the remission of taxes on prior stage inputs, 
including those inputs normally consumed during production such as 
 
 
161
 The rules on subsidies are a little bit more flexible for primary products, meaning mainly 
the products of fishing, forestry, agriculture, and mineral exploitation. 
 
162
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. VI ¶ 4 (“No product of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or 
countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the 
like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of 
the refund of such duties or taxes.”). 
 
163
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. VI ¶ 4 states that “[n]o product of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-
dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes 
borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or 
by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.” Additionally, Note Ad for GATT Article XVI states 
that “[t]he exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when 
destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess 
of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.” 
 
164
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 7. 
 
165
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 144-45; see also Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 293. 
 
166
 GATT, supra note 16, Ad Art. XVI. 
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energy, fuels, oil, and catalysts.
167
 Roland Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff 
argue that GHG allowances or permits should qualify as prior stage 
inputs rather than as government services because the benefit of the 
GHG reduction program primarily benefits the wider community rather 
than individual businesses.
168
 
One thesis of this Article is that costs related to the regulation of 
GHG-producing inputs such as energy or fuel oil are eligible for 
adjustment without being classified as a prohibited export subsidy.
169
 In 
defining what can be classified as an export subsidy, the SCM 
Agreement states that “prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may be 
exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not 
exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic 
consumption, if the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on 
inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product.”170 
The SCM Agreement further explains that “[i]nputs consumed in the 
production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and 
oil used in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in 
the course of their use to obtain the exported product.”171 A broad 
reading of the SCM Agreement would thus include most kinds of 
domestic GHG regulatory costs. 
There are arguments for a more narrow reading of the SCM 
Agreement. There has been significant discussion concerning the above-
quoted clauses in the SCM Agreement because these clauses appear to 
broaden the scope of BTAs, a conclusion that seems preposterous to 
some.
172
 As noted above, the SCM Agreement allows “prior stage 
cumulative indirect taxes” for inputs consumed in the production 
process; “prior stage indirect taxes” are defined as “those levied on 
goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product,” 
while “cumulative indirect taxes” are defined as “multi staged taxes 
 
 
167
 SCM Agreement, Annex 1(h) (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/docs_ 
e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#tbt; Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 144. 
 
168
 Id. Ismer and Neuhoff also make the argument that free allocation of permits would reduce 
the overall effectiveness of a BTA by lowering the domestic cost of GHG regulations.  Id. 
 
169
 See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 29 (noting that it has been argued that 
“specific taxes on energy, fuel or oil used in the production process should also be eligible for 
adjustment on the export of the final product”). 
 
170
 SCM  Agreement, Annex I: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies (h) (1994). 
 
171
 Id. at Annex II n.61.This particular footnote has been the subject of quite a bit of debate, 
not the least of which involves a “gentlemen‟s agreement” whereby countries agreed not to use this 
clause to adjust energy or carbon taxes. Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 30. While 
countries may follow such an agreement, there is no indication that a WTO decisional body would 
treat it as anything more than an interesting historical note. See id. 
 
172
 See, e.g., BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 85-7. 
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levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if 
the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in 
a succeeding stage of production.”173 Common sense and the plain 
meaning of this definition, in spite of potential linguistic difficulties 
between the equally official French and English versions, should include 
BTAs for GHG inputs: GHG-producing activities are used directly or 
indirectly in making the products to which a GHG-based BTA would 
apply. 
Thus, the main problem must be with the definition of 
“cumulative.” However, because taxes on GHG inputs must build upon 
one another in order to be effective, GHG-input taxes would occur at 
multiple stages in the production process—at the very least applying to 
inputs for energy and various raw materials. There is no proposed 
method for crediting succeeding stages of GHG-taxed production with 
the costs of the GHG taxes on previous stages, a process that would fit 
the definition of “cumulative” as it is used in the SCM Agreement. It 
seems likely that this language was purely designed to exclude Value 
Added Taxes—for which products are credited at each succeeding level 
of production—and is not applicable to GHG-related BTAs. 
However broad the language in the SCM Agreement may appear to 
be, some still argue that the negotiators at the Uruguay Round were 
attempting to limit the application of BTAs to certain energy intensive 
exports from developed countries and had no intention of allowing BTA 
for energy taxes in general.
174
 Because of these arguments, it is possible 
that a WTO decisional body will interpret “prior stage cumulative 
indirect taxes” narrowly to encompass only specific types of cascade 
taxes. Though this is the conclusion reached by the WTO Secretariat,
175
 
as well as by some commentators in this area, there has been no definite 
conclusion by a WTO decisional body that taxes on inputs not physically 
present in the final product cannot be adjusted for. Rather, such “original 
intent” arguments are not generally considered persuasive by 
international decisional bodies. Instead, international law adheres closely 
to rules of treaty interpretation that state that a “treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose,” as laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
 
 
173
 SCM  Agreement, Annex 1 n.58. 
 
174
 See, e.g., BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 86-87; Note by the Secretariat, Taxes and 
Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax Adjustment, ¶ 76, WT/CTE/W/47 (May 2, 1997). 
 
175
 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 174, ¶ 76. 
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Treaties.
176
 Only where the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous or obscure 
is recourse to be given to works relating to the preparation of the treaty 
and the original intent of the treaty‟s negotiators.177 Indeed, as discussed 
below, in United States—Superfund a GATT Panel declined to 
distinguish a BTA on the basis of a physical incorporation standard and 
allowed export adjustment for chemicals that had been used in the 
production process but were not present in the final product. Though this 
case was decided before the SPS Agreement was instituted in 1994, it 
provides a precedent for a broader reading. Significantly, it also shows 
that a broader reading of the 1994 SPS Agreement, such as that in United 
States—Superfund, would not broaden the scope of GATT‟s subsidy 
regulations to include export BTAs for substances not incorporated into a 
final product. 
ii. BTAs for Imported Products 
The analysis of BTAs on imports has two parts. First, the National 
Treatment Principle, referred to earlier, states that foreign producers 
must be treated the same as domestic producers for like, competitive, or 
substitutable products.
178
 This means that like products must be taxed 
similarly (though not necessarily identically).
179
 It is a violation of GATT 
to protect domestic production through discriminatory taxation.
180
 
A BTA measure must thus be relatively exact in the calculation of 
domestic charges to be applied to imports. In fact, the Working Party 
notes that “countries adjusting taxes, should, at all times, be prepared, if 
requested, to account for the reasons for adjustment, for the methods 
 
 
176
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(1), 23 May 1969, available at 
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/.../conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
 
177
 Id. at Art. 32. 
 
178
 See GATT, supra note 16, Art. III ¶ 2 (“The products of the territory of any contracting 
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly 
or indirectly, to like domestic products.”); see also GATT Art. III ¶ 1 (“contracting parties recognize 
that internal taxes and other internal charges . . . should not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”). 
 
179
 “A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic products is thus 
neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Article III:4.  Whether or not imported 
products are treated „less favourably‟ than like domestic products should be assessed instead by 
examining whether a measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the 
detriment of imported products.” Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Import of 
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 137, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), 
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm. 
 
180
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 148-49. 
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used, for the amount of compensation and to furnish proof thereof.”181 
Thus, a well-crafted BTA ties the calculation of border adjustments to 
the levels of domestic taxes, especially where domestic taxes can 
fluctuate over time. 
Second, the Most Favored Nation Principle means any advantage 
with respect to border restrictions granted to an exporting country must 
also be granted to all exporters of similar, or like, products.
182
 In other 
words, a BTA measure would have to apply equally no matter which 
country produced a particular product. This poses problems for BTAs 
that discriminate between importing countries on the basis of their GHG 
regulation, as many proposed BTAs do. Therefore, as will be discussed 
in greater detail later on, BTAs must either (1) be promulgated on the 
basis that products produced without GHG regulation are not like 
physically identical products produced with such regulation, or (2) 
specifically tax GHG emissions themselves as product inputs. 
A GATT Panel decision, United States—Superfund, explains the 
requirements of Article III in the context of BTAs.
183
 In order to fund the 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, the United States imposed BTAs on 
certain chemicals and on products produced or manufactured using those 
chemicals.
184
 The Panel concluded that the tax imposed by the United 
States was 
imposed on the imported substances because they are produced from 
chemicals subject to an excise tax in the United States and the tax rate 
is determined in principle in relation to the amount of these chemicals 
used and not in relation to the value of the imported substance.  The 
Panel therefore concluded that, to the extent that the tax on certain 
imported substances was equivalent to the tax borne by like domestic 
substances as a result of the tax on certain chemicals the tax met the 
national treatment requirement of Article III:2, first sentence.
185
 
Thus the Panel concluded that GATT allowed import BTAs for product 
inputs subject to an internal tax.
186
 
 
 
181
 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 17, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. 
 
182
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. I ¶ 1. 
 
183
 Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, 
¶ 2.1, L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 17, 1987), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm. 
 
184
 Id. 
 
185
 Id. at ¶ 5.2.8 (emphasis added). 
 
186
 Goh, supra note 15, at 412. But see Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 293 (agreeing that 
United States—Superfund contained too much uncertainty about whether chemicals were present in 
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Which domestic charges can be applied to imports hinges on 
whether those charges are direct or indirect with respect to the 
producer.
187
 The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments decided 
“that there was convergence of views to the effect that taxes directly 
levied on products [not on producers] were eligible for tax adjustment. 
Examples of such taxes comprised specific excise duties, sales taxes and 
cascade taxes and the tax on value added.”188 Additionally, “certain taxes 
that were not directly levied on products [but rather on producers] were 
not eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of such taxes comprised social 
security charges whether on employers or employees and payroll 
taxes.”189 Thus, much of the debate surrounding BTAs revolves around 
the classification of the adjustment as either direct or indirect. GATT 
tends to follow the destination principle where indirect taxes are 
concerned and the origin principle (taxation of products where they are 
produced) where direct taxes on producers are concerned.
190
 
Unfortunately, if not unsurprisingly, the Working Party did not 
address the kind of energy and other GHG-related inputs that a BTA 
targeted at climate change would encompass.
191
 Indeed, the Working 
Party seemed to suggest that the whole direct/indirect distinction was 
economically inexplicable, stating that “the economic basis for such a 
clear distinction between indirect and direct taxes for adjustment 
purposes has not been demonstrated.”192 Some of the Working Party 
concluded that the distinction was based more on the relative purpose of 
the tax—either the tax was directed toward internal consumption in 
keeping with the destination principle (indirect, and thus BTA eligible) 
or toward entrepreneurs‟ profits and personal income (direct, and thus 
BTA ineligible).
193
 This line of reasoning has borne little fruit in WTO 
and GATT decisions, however, even though the balance of opinion 
seems to hold that the structure of the market, business cycles, and other 
 
the final products to give the case strong precedential value where inputs are not apparent in the final 
product). 
 
187
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146. 
 
188
 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 14, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. 
 
189
 Id. 
 
190
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 8-9. Remember, the origin principle states that 
taxes should be applied where a particular good is produced, while the destination principle states 
that taxes should be applied where a particular good is sold. 
 
191
 See, supra note 188, ¶ 15(a). In fact, the Working Party concluded that the importance of 
such taxes in the context of BTAs “was not such as to justify further examination.” Id. at ¶ 15. It 
appears that times have changed. 
 
192
 Id. at ¶ 21. 
 
193
 Id. 
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economic conditions have more to do with what kinds of taxes get passed 
along to consumers than the direct/indirect classification.
194
 Paul 
Demaret and Raoul Stewardson conclude that, for practical and 
administrative reasons, however, there is no real prospect of the 
distinction between direct and indirect taxes being abandoned in favor of 
a more accurate system of classification.
195
 In spite of this balance of 
opinion, the apparent economic rationale now used to describe the 
distinction between direct and indirect taxation is that direct taxes are not 
passed along to consumers, while indirect taxes are. 
A GATT Panel report in 1976, United States—DISC, reinforced the 
distinction between direct and indirect taxes.
196
 The Panel in United 
States—DISC held that the refund by the United States of direct taxes on 
exports was a subsidy in violation of GATT obligations.
197
 The 1994 
SCM Agreement includes some relevant definitions in this context: 
The term “direct taxes” shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, 
rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the 
ownership of real property; . . . The term “indirect taxes” shall mean 
sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, 
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than 
direct taxes and import charges. . . . .
198
 
Ismer and Neuhoff argue that the wording of Article II “does not 
indicate that the clause actually seeks to disallow tax adjustment at the 
border,” leading them to conclude that the symmetric treatment of 
imports and exports warrants BTAs for things like energy inputs.
199
 The 
argument for symmetric treatment is supported by its simplicity, by the 
Article I phrase “originating in or destined for,”200 by the coherent and 
efficient application of the destination principle upon which GATT was 
based, and by its consequent avoidance of trade distortions such as 
double taxation and non-taxation.
201
 
While it is at least somewhat accepted that BTAs are allowed for 
 
 
194
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 15. 
 
195
 Id. at 15-16. 
 
196
 Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation, L/4422 - 23S/98 (Nov. 12, 1976), 
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/usdisc.pdf. 
 
197
 Id. at ¶ 72. 
 
198
 SCM Agreement, Annex I n.58 (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
legal_e.htm#tbt. 
 
199
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146-47; see also Veel, supra note 32, at 774. 
 
200
 OLE KRISTIAN FAUCHALD, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND TRADE DISCRIMINATION (1998). 
 
201
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 147; see also Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 
31. 
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taxes levied on physically incorporated inputs,
202
 various commentators 
have come down on both sides of the question of how to classify 
adjustments for different kinds of non-physically incorporated GHG-
related input taxes. The argument that energy inputs, for instance, cannot 
be adjusted for seems to revolve around the language of GATT Article 
II:2, which states that adjustments can be made “in respect of an article 
from which the imported product has been manufactured in whole or in 
part.”203 
According to this argument, energy cannot be regarded as an 
“article” at all, especially not one from which a product has been 
manufactured. Rather, the word “article” should be applicable only to 
ingredients physically incorporated in the final product. However, this 
interpretation is open to debate, especially as the word “article” can mean 
a distinct member of a class of things, such as a unit of energy.
204
 The 
French can also be translated indifferent ways, as “goods,” or maybe 
even as “commodities,” which under a modern understanding of trade 
could certainly include energy or other GHG-producing activities. All of 
this linguistic argumentation is merely by way of saying that, while 
WTO decisional bodies could use this sort of analysis to exclude so-
called intangible production ingredients, they have not done so thus far 
and seem inclined, rather, to take the simpler expedient of allowing 
BTAs for all types of inputs.
205
 
A WTO Panel implicitly addressed some issues related to BTAs for 
product inputs in Argentina—Hides and Leather.206 The European 
Community brought a complaint against Argentina for a value-added tax 
of nine percent on imported leather products.
207
 In its analysis the Panel 
concluded that “a determination of whether an infringement of Article 
III:2, first sentence, exists must be made on the basis of an overall 
assessment of the actual tax burdens imposed on imported products, on 
the one hand, and like domestic products, on the other hand.”208 
Furthermore, in supporting this conclusion, the Panel cited language 
 
 
202
 See supra note 23, at 20; see also BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 84-85. 
 
203
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. II ¶ 2. Or, from the French text, “une merchandise qui a été 
incorporée dans l‟article importé.” Id. 
 
204
 “article (är´tĭ-ekel) n. Abbr. art. “1. An individual thing in a class; item . . . 6. A particular 
part or subject; a point or specific matter.” HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 74 (William Morris ed. 1978). 
 
205
 See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 292. 
 
206
 Report of the Panel, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the 
Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000), available at www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds155_e.htm. 
 
207
 Id. at ¶ 1.1. 
 
208
 Id. at ¶ 11.184. 
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from Japan—Alcohol stating that all tax burdens, including “indirect 
taxation by taxing the raw materials used in the product during the 
various stages of its production,” must be taken into account.209 Because 
the Panel focused on “raw materials used in the product,” it implicitly 
acknowledged the possibility of BTAs on non-physically incorporated 
product inputs.
210
 
There is a potential distinction to be made between product inputs 
and the byproducts of product manufacturing. Veel points out this 
distinction, noting that “emissions allowances in the [European Union 
Emissions Trading System] and the Lieberman-Warner Bill are not 
charges on „articles from which the imported product has been 
manufactured,‟ but rather are charges on by-products of the 
manufacturing process.”211 However, this is likely drawing too fine a 
distinction on a somewhat confusing aspect of WTO jurisprudence—
especially when taken in conjunction with GATT Article XX‟s 
investigation of the purpose of a given trade measure.
212
 The technical 
wording of GATT Article II:2 can indeed be used to draw the distinction 
underlined by Veel, but the purpose of the sections in question is to allow 
countries to impose BTAs rather than to govern the purpose or policy 
behind any particular border measure (unlike GATT Article XX, which 
explicitly investigates the purpose of a trade measure). It did not matter 
why Argentina was taxing any particular leather input in Argentina—
Hides and Leather, just as it does not matter why the European Union 
might decide to tax energy or any other raw material at a particular rate. 
What matters, rather, is that domestic products are not given better tax 
 
 
209
 Id. at ¶ 11.183 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 
5.8, 1996 WL 910779 (Oct. 4, 1996)). 
 
210
 See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 293 (stating that Argentina—Hides and Leather 
“provides some support for BTAs on production inputs not incorporated in the final product”). 
 
211
 Veel, supra note 32, at 774 (quoting GATT Art. II ¶ 2(a)). 
 
212
 See GATT, supra note 16, Art. XX ¶¶  (a)-(i)  (“Subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination . . . nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) relating to the importations or 
exportations of gold or silver; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement . . . (e) relating to the products of prison 
labour; (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; (h) undertaken in 
pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement . . . (i) involving 
restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such 
materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials 
is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan. . . .”). 
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treatment than imported products, and the purpose to which that tax 
treatment is applied is mostly irrelevant. 
Indeed, Gavin Goh concludes that “[e]nergy tax adjustments at the 
border would be permitted under Article III:2 so long as the „actual tax 
burden‟ on with respect to taxes applied on inputs was not in excess of 
that on the like domestic good.”213 The broad definition of overall tax 
burdens, he reasons, acknowledges that adjustments can be made for 
production inputs to finished products.
214
 Goh cautions that the language 
of Article III:2 may support an alternate view—one that holds that only 
those taxes applied directly to the finished product, and not inputs to that 
product, can be applied to imported products. Specifically, the line 
“directly or indirectly” could apply  
more to the manner of application of the tax, as opposed to the nature 
of the tax itself. To interpret the term „applied . . . indirectly, to‟ 
products as including taxes applied on other products used in the 
production of the imported and domestic goods at issue would extend 
the term beyond its ordinary meaning.
215
 
However, this argument seems to be contradicted by the 1970 Working 
Party.
216
 In noting that there was some difference in the language used to 
describe taxes levied on imports and exports, the Working Party 
concluded that “differences in wording had not led to any differences in 
interpretation of the provisions . . . GATT provisions on tax adjustment 
applied the principle of destination identically to imports and exports.”217 
Goh‟s argument consequently has been rejected as well by the majority 
of WTO decisional law and commentary. 
If, contrary to the above analysis, a given BTA scheme is not in 
compliance with the substantive portions of GATT, it is possible that the 
scheme could be justified under GATT Article XX. Article XX 
 
 
213
 Goh, supra note 15, at 406. 
 
214
 Id. However, Goh presents a counter-argument that would prohibit BTAs for PPMs by 
suggesting that the relevant basis of comparison between like domestic and imported products is 
actually the taxes applied to final products rather than the taxes applied to product inputs or 
manufacturing processes. The basis for this argument, however, is the wording of Article III:2—Goh 
claims that PPM taxes are “borne by” domestic products, while BTAs are “applied to” imported 
products, and that this distinction in the language of GATT leads to his final product distinction. Id. 
It seems unlikely that a WTO decisional body would reach so fine a distinction on the basis of 
ambiguous language when the WTO has yet to show any inclination to micromanage BTA measures 
to the extent suggested by Goh. 
 
215
 Id. at 410. 
 
216
 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 10, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. 
 
217
 Id. 
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exceptions are covered in depth later in this analysis, in sections II.C. and 
II.D. 
C. GATT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING “LIKE” PRODUCT ANALYSIS 
Products that are not considered either “like” or “competing” under 
the language of GATT Article III can be taxed at different rates without 
any danger of WTO repercussions. Thus governments often find it 
valuable to attempt to distinguish between products, especially when 
seeking to further other policy goals such as protecting the environment 
or human rights. For instance, an environmentally minded government 
may wish to tax organically produced bananas at a lower rate than 
bananas produced using standard agricultural practices, even though 
organic bananas may be competing with, or are “like,” regular bananas. 
Until recently, however, WTO decisional law has not tended to support 
distinctions drawn on the basis of production methods.
218
 
Moreover, not just identical but also “competing” imported products 
are considered “like” for the purposes of GATT Article III. The 
Appellate Body‟s ruling in Asbestos showed that the test for 
competitiveness should take place in an idealized marketplace where 
consumers have relevant information.
219
 Also relevant is GATT Note Ad 
Article III, which states that a measure affecting imported competing 
products is inconsistent with Article III “only in cases where competition 
was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the 
other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not 
similarly taxed.”220 The important distinction here is whether a tax on 
imports tends to protect competing domestic products, whether or not 
those imports are taxed the same as like domestic products.
221
 
The WTO adopted the definitive test for product likeness in Japan—
Alcohol.
222
 Japan—Alcohol concerned shochu and vodka, not identical 
 
 
218
 Indeed, Dominic Gentile concludes that “products produced in an environmentally 
unfriendly manner cannot be treated differently than products produced in an environmentally 
friendly manner on the sole basis of the difference in process or production method.” Gentile, supra 
note 31, at 7207. However, Gentile‟s conclusion was largely based on the Panel decision in Tuna—
Dolphin I, a decision that has been largely marginalized by later Appellate Body decisions, such as 
the Shrimp—Turtle series of cases. This will be addressed later on in this Article, when GATT 
Article XX(g) is discussed in detail. 
 
219
 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 122, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm; see also Green, supra note 30, at 159. 
 
220
 GATT, supra note 16, Note Ad Article III. 
 
221
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 35. 
 
222
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146. 
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products but nonetheless considered to serve the same end uses. Thus, 
the differential treatment of shochu and vodka served protectionist 
purposes.
223
 In this case, the Appellate Body construed the language of 
GATT Article III:2 narrowly, considering the various characteristics of 
the products in each case.
224
 According to the Appellate Body, likeness 
“must be determined by the particular provision in which the term „like‟ 
is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that 
prevail in any given case to which that provision may apply.”225 In the 
case of Article III, a somewhat precise (because it involves non-
exclusive factors) six-factor test was set forth to determine likeness: (1) 
whether the two products share the same physical characteristics, (2) the 
similarity of the two products‟ properties, (3) the functional likeness of 
the two products‟ natures and qualities, (4) whether the two products 
have similar end uses in a given market, (5) consumers‟ tastes and habits 
with regard to distinguishing the two products and willingness to 
substitute one for the other, and (6) the tariff classification of the 
products.
226
 
Later cases showed that the size of the producer was irrelevant to 
likeness determinations, even if small foreign producers were given 
similar preferential treatment to small domestic producers.
227
 In United 
States—Malt Beverages Panel, the Panel also implied that the origins of 
a product‟s ingredients are not sufficiently distinctive to allow 
preferential tax treatment.
228
 Whether products were being distinguished 
for protectionist purposes was, again, important to this decision.
229
 
Where BTAs for GHG-related product inputs are concerned, the 
most obvious objects of a like-product analysis are final products rather 
than the raw materials used during manufacture.
230
 Inputs such as energy 
and fuel do not tend to show up in the physical properties of the final 
product, making it difficult to classify products as unlike based solely on 
 
 
223
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 36. 
 
224
 See Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 13, 1996 WL 910779 
(Oct. 4, 1996). 
 
225
 Id. at 12. 
 
226
 Id. at 20-23; see also Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146; Report of the Working Party, 
Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 18, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/ 
gattpanels/bordertax.pdf (stating that the determination should be based on “the product‟s end-uses 
in a given market; consumers‟ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the 
product‟s properties, nature and quality”). 
 
227
 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, ¶ 5.6, 1992 WL 799397 (Mar. 16, 1992). 
 
228
 Id. at ¶ 5.22. 
 
229
 See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 38. 
 
230
 Goh, supra note 15, at 407. 
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GHGs emitted during production.
231
 The only one of the criteria for 
distinguishing products, enumerated earlier, that might conceivably 
apply is consumer perceptions and differentiation. Most commentators, 
however, conclude that consumer differentiation on these grounds is 
unlikely to be argued and difficult to prove.
232
 
i. Environmental Process and Production Methods 
Distinguishing like or competing products on the basis of the 
process or production method (PPM) used to produce that product is 
another important arena where BTAs for GHG inputs will be tested. This 
is because GHG regulation tends to target the manner in which products 
are produced rather than specific final products, whereas GATT tends to 
focus on the final product. Thus, debate about whether GATT prohibits 
regulation on the basis of PPMs could be central to any discussion of 
compatibility between climate-centered regulation and the WTO.
233
 
The TBT Agreement established regulations concerning PPMs.
234
 
Essentially, regulations on a product‟s specifications, such as size or 
weight, are not PPM-based regulations, while regulations concerning the 
methods used to make the product are PPM-based regulations.
235
 PPMs 
are often distinguished by referring to them as either product-related or 
product-unrelated, based on whether the PPM regulation in question is 
related to the physical functionality of the product. One example of a 
product-related PPM regulation would be a measure requiring process-
based sanitary conditions in the handling of imported meat products.
236
 
Non-product-related PPMs encompass measures addressing issues like 
labor standards and environmental protection. It is PPM-based 
regulations, and further, non-product-related PPMs, that tend to be the 
most controversial.
237
 
 
 
231
 Id. at 407-08. 
 
232
 Id. Goh points out that the regulatory creation of consumer differentiation may trigger 
WTO review of whether the regulation has a protectionist purpose, with the implication being that 
such purpose could invalidate an argument that imported products are not like domestic products. 
See also Hawkins, supra note 33, at 434. 
 
233
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 12. 
 
234
 TBT Agreement, supra note 133. 
 
235
 Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental ―PPMs‖ in the WTO: Debunking the Myth 
of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT‟L L. 59, 64-65 (2002) (“For example, a law prohibiting the landing of 
fish caught using a driftnet is a PPM. By contrast, a law prohibiting the sale of fish smaller than a 
prescribed size is not a PPM.”). 
 
236
 See id. 
 
237
 See Goh, supra note 15, at 402 (“it is less clear whether Article III:2 permits border tax 
adjustments on a final product for taxes applied on inputs, such as energy, used in the production 
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While BTAs in general are quite common, BTAs based on PPMs 
are rarer.
238
 Most commentators believe that PPMs are irrelevant for 
likeness determinations under GATT Article III, and that the WTO 
judiciary shares this view.
239
 If this is true, then PPM-based measures 
would need to qualify for one of the GATT Article XX exceptions in 
order to be WTO-compliant. 
On the other hand, others have argued that Shrimp—Turtle opened 
the door for states to distinguish otherwise like products on the basis of 
process and production methods.
240
 In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate 
Body upheld an import ban predicated on the level of environmental 
protection in shrimp-exporting countries.
241
 In other words, the PPM 
used to produce the shrimp was held to be sufficient basis for trade 
measures. If this is so, products produced without GHG regulation could 
be distinguished from products produced with GHG regulation and taxed 
however a particular country wanted to, without running afoul of GATT 
Article I or III. In spite of the optimism surrounding Shrimp—Turtle, 
however, it is important to notice the complexity of PPM issues and the 
ease with which an open-ended reading of the “like product” language in 
the WTO agreements could be turned to protectionist purposes—and the 
wariness with which any WTO decisional body would confront the 
possibility of protectionist behavior. Also, Shrimp—Turtle involved 
GATT Article XX, which (as explained in detail below) gives a WTO 
decisional body more leeway to rein in disguised protectionist measures. 
There have been some limited examples of PPM-based BTAs, such 
as a tax levied by the United States on ozone-depleting chemicals 
 
process”). 
 
238
 BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 76. 
 
239
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 148; see also Green, supra note 30, at 161-63 (“The 
general view has been that PPMs requirements based on the energy efficiency or emissions of the 
method of processing or production will not be found to comply with GATT.”); Zhang & Assunção, 
supra note 33, at 380 (“[i]t would appear that such BTA adjustments for imports on the basis of their 
MPPMs is in direct conflict with the GATT/WTO principles”); Green &Epps, supra note 135, at 
292. 
 
240
 See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 
12 (in Shrimp—Turtle, the WTO “may have opened the doors to the permissibility of trade measures 
based on PPMs”). 
 
241
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21, 2001), 
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. In an effort to protect sea 
turtles, the United States issued regulations under Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act to 
require both domestic and foreign programs to prevent accidental sea turtle deaths as a result of 
shrimp-harvesting practices, primarily through the inclusion of Turtle Excluder Devices.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
Countries that did not enact regulations at least as effective as the regulations in the United States at 
preventing sea turtle deaths could not import their shrimp into markets in the United States.  Id. at  ¶ 
5. 
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(ODCs). The ODC tax was instituted to accomplish obligations incurred 
by the United States under the 1987 Montreal Protocol, applied to 
chemicals proportionally to their ozone-depleting potential, and 
increased every year.
242
 BTAs were applied to all products produced 
using ODCs, including ODCs used only for cleaning purposes and not 
present in the final product.
243
 If actual consumption of ODCs was not 
reported, predominant production methods in the United States were 
used to estimate the tax for each particular product.
244
 WTO approval of 
such taxes, and of the use of predominant production methods to 
determine tax levels, highlights an important methodology for the 
implementation of GHG-based BTAs. 
Another example of a PPM-based BTA was a tax levied by the 
United States to fund the cost of hazardous waste cleanup. In United 
States—Superfund, a WTO Panel in 1987 decided a suit brought against 
the United States by Mexico, Canada, and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) because of taxes imposed on specific imported 
chemicals to further such cleanups.
245
 The measure enacted by the United 
States, termed an environmental excise tax, included a tax on imported 
products based on the amount of domestically taxable chemicals used 
during production.
246
 If relevant PPM information was not supplied by 
importers, the United States Treasury used predominant production 
methods employed in the United States to determine the rate of tax.
247
 
Because the tax was based on the process used to make the product 
rather than on the physical characteristics of the product itself, it 
represented a true PPM-based BTA.
248
 
Citing the report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, 
the Panel in United States—Superfund held that 
[w]hether a sales tax is levied on a product for general revenue 
purposes or to encourage the rational use of environmental resources, 
is . . . not relevant for the determination of the eligibility of a tax for 
border tax adjustment . . . The tax on certain chemicals, being a tax  
 
 
 
 
242
 BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 78. 
 
243
 Id. at 79. 
 
244
 Id. 
 
245
 Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 1.1, 
L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 5, 1987), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm. 
 
246
 Id. at ¶¶  2.1-2.6. 
 
247
 Id. at ¶ 2.4. 
 
248
 BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 77. 
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directly imposed on products, was eligible for border tax adjustment 
independent of the purpose it served.
249
 
In other words, so long as the tax was applied to imports at a level 
not higher than equivalent charges applied to domestic producers, it was 
irrelevant that the BTA was aimed at environmental PPMs—the 
important point was that the tax adjustment was determined in relation to 
the amount of chemicals used.
250
 This reasoning is especially important 
for analysis of GHG-based BTAs and the Most Favored Nation clause of 
GATT Article I because it is irrelevant that such BTAs are targeted at 
specific countries with weak GHG regulations. United States—Superfund 
shows that what is important is that the tax adjustment be calculated in 
respect to the amount of GHG produced. 
According to some, United States—Superfund raised serious 
questions that might, in turn, apply to other PPM-based environmental 
regulation, such as a BTA for GHGs.
251
 Little effort was made to 
specifically address the PPM issue in United States—Superfund, as the 
Panel lumped PPM-related taxes in with the other taxes at issue in the 
case. Another objection that has since been raised to the decision in 
United States—Superfund is that the requirement for foreign firms to 
provide commercial and proprietary information about the methods used 
to produce their products risked the exposure of sensitive information to 
competitors. Final objections to United States—Superfund include the 
danger of double taxation and the potential violation of “polluter pays” 
principles since foreign firms are being asked to pay for pollution that 
they did not necessarily cause.
252
 
D. GATT ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS 
Article XX of GATT and its ten subdivisions contain ten specific 
exceptions that allow measures that might otherwise violate one of the 
 
 
249
 United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 5.2.4, L/6175 - 
34S/136. 
 
250
 “The Panel accepted the US argument that GATT 1947 contemplated the possibility for 
border tax adjustments in respect of imported products that contained substances subject to an 
internal tax.” Goh, supra note 15, at 403-04. 
 
251
 See, e.g., BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 77-81; Goh, supra note 15, at 404-15. 
 
252
 Goh, supra note 15, at 404-05. It must be pointed out, though, that Goh portrays the 
“polluter pays” principle as an assumption that the polluter has already paid, a bit of a stretch 
considering the state of world environmental regulation. Later, Goh even contradicts his earlier 
caution when he states that a BTA on energy inputs would correspond to the “polluter pays” 
principle because polluters would be taxed irrespective of where their goods were produced. Id. at 
415. 
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articles of GATT. These exceptions generally address trade issues vital 
to the sovereignty of GATT member states or issues that are considered 
basic tenets of international human rights. There are two parts to an 
Article XX analysis: the subdivisions, and the chapeau,
253
 or first 
paragraph.
254
 For climate-related BTAs, only subdivisions (b) and (g) are 
directly relevant.
255
 Relevant to environmental concerns, Article XX(b) 
states that GATT shall not interfere with measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health,”256 and Article XX(g) excepts 
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.”257 The chapeau of Article XX has 
two basic requirements: (1) that “measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,” 
and (2) that such measures not be “a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”258 According to the Appellate Body in Shrimp—Turtle, the 
chapeau of Article XX “must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection 
and conservation of the environment.”259 Though not explicitly 
applicable to the whole WTO, this language from Shrimp—Turtle can be 
read to imply that contemporary standards of interpretation should apply 
to all of the subdivisions of Article XX.
260
 
i. GATT Article XX(b) 
GATT Article XX(b) implicitly adheres to its own two-part 
structure: (1) making sure that the measure in question protects human, 
animal, or plant life or health; and (2) making sure that the measure is 
necessary. “Necessary” has been interpreted to mean that the trade 
 
 
253
 “Chapeau” means “hat” or “cap” in French. www.french-linguistics.co.uk/dictionary/ 
englishfrench/. 
 
254
 This two-step approach was applied by the WTO in Reformulated Gasoline, Shrimp—
Turtle, and Asbestos, as will be described below. See also Ghei, supra note 49, at 119; Ismer & 
Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 149-50. 
 
255
 Id. at 149; see also Goh, supra note 15, at 414; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, 
at 37. 
 
256
 GATT, supra note 16, Art. XX(b). 
 
257
 Id. Art. XX(g). 
 
258
 Id. Art. XX. 
 
259
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 129, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. 
 
260
 Goh, supra note 15, at 414. 
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measure in question must be the least trade-restrictive measure possible 
under the circumstances.
261
 To satisfy the second requirement, a series of 
factors must be weighed and balanced, including the importance of the 
common interests protected, the contribution of the trade restriction to 
the success of the protection, and the impact of the measure on trade 
flows.
262
 According to the Appellate Body in Korea—Beef, the court may  
take into account the relative importance of the common interests or 
values that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. 
The more vital or important those common interests or values are, the 
easier it would be to accept as „necessary‟ a measure designed as an 
enforcement instrument.
263
 
In Asbestos, a case that illustrates the successful application of an 
Article XX(b) exception, Canada challenged France‟s unilateral ban on 
the import of all products containing asbestos.
264
 France defended on the 
grounds that the ban was justified under the provisions of Article XX(b) 
as a protection of human health.
265
 The Appellate Body upheld the 
measure, based on a WTO Panel‟s finding “that the measure at issue is 
„necessary to protect human . . . life or health‟, within the meaning of 
Article XX(b).”266 The WTO Panel reasoned that France‟s measure 
satisfied the chapeau of Article XX and was not discriminatory (and 
therefore not arbitrary or unjustifiable) because it treated all asbestos 
 
 
261
 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, ¶ 5.52, 1992 WL 799397 (Mar. 16, 1992) (“It was incumbent upon the United States to 
demonstrate that . . . the discriminatory common carrier requirement for imported beer and wine is 
necessary to secure compliance with those laws. In the view of the Panel, the United States has not 
demonstrated that the common carrier requirement is the least trade restrictive enforcement measure 
available to the various states and that less restrictive measures, e.g. record-keeping requirements of 
retailers and importers, are not sufficient for tax administration purposes. In this regard, the Panel 
noted that not all fifty states of the United States maintain common carrier requirements. It thus 
appeared to the Panel that some states have found alternative, and possibly less trade restrictive, and 
GATT-consistent, ways of enforcing their tax laws. The Panel accordingly found that the United 
States has not met its burden of proof in respect of its claimed Article XX(d) justification for the 
common carrier requirement of the various states.”). 
 
262
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 150. 
 
263
 While Korea—Beef is primarily addressing GATT Article XX(d) in this paragraph, the 
language and structure of XX(b) and (d) are closely enough related to enable us to draw precedential 
conclusions from the language in Korea—Beef. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting 
Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 162, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 
2000), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm. 
 
264
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 1-3, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
265
 Id. 
 
266
 Id. at ¶ 192(f). 
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identically by banning it.
267
 The Appellate Body agreed, stating that “it is 
undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given 
situation.”268 In so ruling, the Appellate Body in Asbestos held that there 
was no “reasonably available” alternative measure that would have been 
less trade-restrictive.
269
 The Appellate Body said that in order to be 
“reasonably available,” the measure had to achieve the same end and be 
less restrictive of trade than a prohibition.
270
 
The opposite conclusion was reached by a GATT Panel in 
Thailand—Cigarettes, where it was found that Thailand could not ban 
the import of foreign cigarettes for health reasons while allowing 
domestic manufacturers to sell cigarettes uninhibited.
271
 Indeed, in that 
case, the presence of contradictory domestic and foreign policies was 
taken as evidence of a disguised restriction on international trade.
272
 The 
key for an Article XX(b) analysis is whether the measure in question is 
actually necessary and whether there is another, less restrictive, trade 
measure that could reasonably be used instead.
273
 In Asbestos, there was 
no measure other than a complete ban that would have allowed France to 
achieve its desired level of health protection.
274
 
Moreover, it appears that in the Appellate Body‟s opinion the more 
important the value a particular measure is trying to protect, the more 
leeway the measure has under Article XX(b).
275
 Specifically, in Asbestos 
the Appellate Body said that “the objective pursued by the measure is the 
preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or 
reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by 
asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital and important in the 
 
 
267
 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 8.228, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), available at www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
268
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
269
 Id. at ¶ 169. 
 
270
 Id. at ¶ 172. 
 
271
 Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, DS10/R - 37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990), available at www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/90cigart.pdf. 
 
272
 Id. at ¶ 81; see also Ghei, supra note 49, at 136. 
 
273
 Id. at 147 (quoting Asbestos Appellate Body Report, at 172, 174). 
 
274
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm; see also Ghei, supra note 49, at 147. 
 
275
 Hawkins, supra note 33, at 436. 
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highest degree.”276 The implication is that the more important the values 
protected, the less leeway an alternative measure would have in a 
determination of that measure‟s suitability. 
More recently, the Appellate Body returned a decision in United 
States—Gambling that contributes to a discussion about what is 
considered more trade-restrictive than necessary.
277
 Though United 
States—Gambling concerned the Global Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), rather than GATT, the Appellate Body held that GATS Article 
XIV exceptions should be interpreted with GATT Article XX exceptions 
in mind, since the two Articles serve identical purposes within the larger 
frameworks of GATS and GATT.
278
 The Appellate Body held that 
necessity was an objective standard to be independently assessed by a 
WTO decisional body, to which the characterization of a measure‟s 
objectives and the effectiveness of the regulatory approach as evidenced 
by the texts of statutes, legislative histories, and governmental 
pronouncements, are relevant.
279
 A weighing and balancing system was 
worked out based on (1) “an assessment of the „relative importance‟ of 
the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure,” (2) “the 
contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it,” 
and (3) “the restrictive impact of the measure on international 
commerce.”280 Challenged measures should be compared to possible 
alternatives in light of “the importance of the interests at issue,” upon 
which evaluation the WTO decisional body will decide “whether 
another, WTO-consistent measure is „reasonably available.‟”281 
In Asbestos, the Appellate Body addressed the issue of scientific 
certainty under GATT Article XX by granting states a great deal of 
leeway.
282
 The Appellate Body said that it would support the discretion 
 
 
276
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 172, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
277
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm. 
 
278
 Id. at ¶ 291 (“Article XIV of the GATS sets out the general exceptions from obligations 
under that Agreement in the same manner as does Article XX of the GATT 1994. Both of these 
provisions affirm the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these 
provisions even if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other 
provisions of the respective agreements”); see also McInerney, supra note 144, at 178. 
 
279
 United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, ¶ 304. 
 
280
 Id. at ¶ 306. 
 
281
 Id. at ¶ 307. 
 
282
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 177, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
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of WTO Panels in weighing available evidence to determine the facts of 
cases.
283
 Additionally, the Appellate Body held that “a Member may also 
rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may 
represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion.”284 In other 
words, WTO members do not have to follow majority scientific opinions 
when setting health policies
285—an important point in the context of 
climate-change discussions because of the range of timeframe 
assessments and the uncertainty surrounding exact damage impacts.
286
 
Though not reached in the context of other GATT Article XX 
exceptions, it seems likely that states will have the benefit of similarly 
wide discretion on issues of scientific certainty if the question arises in 
future cases.
287
 
ii. GATT Article XX(g) 
Under Article XX(g), the key considerations are (1) whether the 
measure in question addresses the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource, and (2) whether the measure has been made in conjunction with 
domestic restrictions. There are two sub-parts to an analysis of whether 
the measure addresses conservation: (a) the precise definition of a 
measure, and (b) the strength of the relationship between the measure 
and the legitimate conservation policy that the measure is aimed at.
288
 In 
Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body defined the measure in 
question as that portion of the United States Clean Air Act found to be in 
conflict with WTO law.
289
 In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body 
handed down a similar ruling limiting the dispute to Section 609 of the 
United States Endangered Species Act.
290
 Thus, the precise measure in 
question under Article XX jurisprudence will be any provision found to 
violate one or more of the substantive provisions of GATT.
291
 
Having established the measure in question, WTO jurisprudence 
 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
283
 Id. 
 
284
 Id. at ¶ 178. 
 
285
 See id.; see also Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at150-51. 
 
286
 Green, supra note 30, at 147. 
 
287
 See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 296. 
 
288
 See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 389-93. 
 
289
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 1, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 
290
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 137, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. 
 
291
 Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 390. 
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considers whether the measure is aimed at a legitimate conservation 
purpose. In Canada—Herring and Salmon a GATT Panel found that 
conservation cannot be merely incidental to the effects of the measure.
292
 
This interpretation was cited favorably by the Reformulated Gasoline 
Panel
293
 and is also supported by the Appellate Body‟s requirement of “a 
close and genuine relationship of ends and means” in Shrimp—Turtle.294 
Essentially, the measure needs to be directly connected to the 
conservation policy.
295
 
Next, the resource being protected by a measure must meet the 
criteria laid down by the Appellate Body for an “exhaustible natural 
resource.” International law generally defines natural resources 
broadly—the 1972 Stockholm Declaration states that they consist of “air, 
water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of 
natural ecosystems.”296 Natural resources have also been defined broadly 
by the Appellate Body in Reformulated Gasoline and in Shrimp—Turtle, 
as well as in other GATT and WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions. 
For instance, such resources are not limited to the territory of the country 
that has imposed restrictions.
297
 Furthermore, in Reformulated Gasoline 
the Panel‟s finding that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource was 
never appealed to the Appellate Body, which nonetheless stated that it 
was willing to accept the Panel‟s ruling.298 
The Panel‟s interpretation in Reformulated Gasoline was backed by 
the Shrimp—Turtle Appellate Body‟s broad interpretation of 
“exhaustible natural resource” so as to include sea turtles because they 
 
 
292
 The Panel concluded that Article XX(g) contains a requirement that a measure be 
primarily aimed at conservation in order to be related to conservation—meaning that a measure 
primarily aimed at protecting Canadian fish processing infrastructure and jobs did not qualify for an 
Article XX(g) exception. Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.7, L/6268 - 35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988), available at 
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/canadaherring.pdf; see also Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 
376; Ghei, supra note 49, at 135-36. 
 
293
 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 
6.39, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds2_e.htm. 
 
294
 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 136, 
WT/DS58/AB/R. 
 
295
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 151. 
 
296
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
StockholmPrinciple 2 (1972), available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp? 
DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503. 
 
297
 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R 
(June 16, 1994), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf; see also 
Gentile, supra note 31, at 206-07. 
 
298
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 4, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
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were both exhaustible (even though renewable) and a natural resource 
(because so defined by other international agreements).
299
 In its ruling 
supporting the actions of the United States in Shrimp—Turtle, the 
Appellate Body held that this broad interpretation of Article XX(g) was 
justified because the Article was not “limited to the conservation of 
„mineral‟ or „non-living‟ natural resources,” and “that „exhaustible‟ 
natural resources and „renewable‟ natural resources are [not] mutually 
exclusive” because so-called “renewable” resources are certainly capable 
of “depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human 
activities.”300 
The final analysis of Article XX(g) concerns whether the measure in 
question was made in conjunction with some kind of domestic regulation 
reaching the same subject.
301
 According to Jasper Ozbirn, “XX(g) does 
not require the specific measure be the source of the domestic 
restrictions, but merely that the country enacting the measure be subject 
to similar [though not identical] regulations.”302 This is supported by the 
Appellate Body‟s reasoning in Reformulated Gasoline finding that 
identical restrictions would not violate GATT Article III:4; to treat 
Article XX(g) as though it required identical regulations would make the 
exceptions clause irrelevant—a result contrary to international treaty 
interpretation practice.
303
 One way of looking at this is that the WTO 
requires the regulating country to have “clean hands” and avoid behavior 
inconsistent with its own stated goals.
304
 
Some commentators believe that environmental and conservation 
purposes tend to be looked upon unfavorably by GATT and WTO Panels 
under Article XX exceptions.
305
 On the other hand, some see the WTO‟s 
role as one of facilitation, ensuring that measures that purport to be 
aimed at environmental goals are not disguised protectionist measures 
aimed at restricting trade and circumventing the WTO‟s larger goal of 
economic prosperity through sustainable development.
306
 Nita Ghei, for 
 
 
299
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 151. 
 
300
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 128, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. For more on Shrimp—Turtle, please see Appendix C. 
 
301
 See Gentile, supra note 31, at 12 (“the key distinction is whether a border measure is 
backed up by some internal regulation”). 
 
302
 Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 403. 
 
303
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 13-14, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Art. 31 (May, 23 1969). 
 
304
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8 at 151. 
 
305
 See, e.g., Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 373-74. 
 
306
 See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376-77. 
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example, claims that the two-step Article XX analysis “has been quite 
effective in distinguishing between legitimate environmental standards 
and environmental standards that primarily function as non-tariff trade 
barriers.”307 
iii. The Chapeau of GATT Article XX 
The chapeau of GATT Article XX functions to prevent abuse of the 
exceptions it contains, based primarily on the principle of good faith.
308
 
In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body explained that the application of 
this principle “prohibits the abusive exercise of a state‟s rights” and 
dictates that the assertion of such rights must be exercised reasonably.
309
 
This means that competing rights should not cancel each other out, but 
rather that the role of the court is to establish a “line of equilibrium” 
between competing interests such that the integrity of the balance of 
rights and obligations established by signatories to the WTO agreements 
is preserved. This line, the Appellate Body has held, can move depending 
on the specific measure at issue and the public policy goals the measure 
furthers.
310
 More and more, the focus of chapeau analysis has centered on 
whether discrimination resulting from a challenged measure is 
reasonably related to the goals of the measure.
311
 
Article XX is designed to allow justifiable violations of the other 
provisions of GATT while attempting to protect the integrity of GATT‟s 
underlying economic philosophy by limiting the abuse of exceptions for 
protectionist purposes. The two primary requirements of the chapeau are 
that a measure not be arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory, and that 
it not be a disguised restriction on international trade. The second of 
these requirements has been interpreted more simply than the first: in 
Asbestos, a WTO Panel found that in order for there to be disguise there 
had to be intent to disguise on the part of the country enacting the 
measure in question.
312
 Therefore, this requirement is seldom invoked 
 
 
307
 Ghei, supra note 49, at 119. 
 
308
 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
¶ 224, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds332_e.htm. 
 
309
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 158, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. 
 
310
 Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 224, WT/DS332/AB/R. 
 
311
 McInerney, supra note 144, at 198. 
 
312
 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 8.236, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), available at www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
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because it is so difficult to prove intent, and the enacting country must be 
found to have intentionally concealed the enactment of the measure.
313
 In 
many circumstances, simple publication of the measure could be enough 
to satisfy this element of the chapeau. 
The first requirement, that a measure not be arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminatory, is more complicated. Two parts seemed to 
emerge from Shrimp—Turtle: (1) that measures be applied flexibly so 
that comparable levels of effectiveness or protection, as opposed to 
identical regulations, are allowed by importing states;
314
 and (2) that 
there has been a prior good-faith effort to reach a multilateral or bilateral 
solution.
315
 Shrimp—Turtle defined trade sanctions dependent on foreign 
environmental regulation as acceptable under WTO law so long as the 
measure was focused on the function and effectiveness of the protections 
implemented rather than the form.
316
 In Shrimp—Turtle, regulations in 
the United States requiring equal effectiveness from foreign 
environmental regulation were legal under GATT, while regulations 
requiring identical legislation were not.
317
 Nita Ghei concludes that 
the greater the use of negotiation, and the greater the flexibility of the 
unilateral measure in achieving its desired end, the more likely the 
measure will pass WTO scrutiny. These conditions also diminish the 
probability that the measure is the result of rent seeking. The 
restrictions imposed by the WTO analysis increases the probability a 
unilateral measure is truly welfare-enhancing; that the measure truly 
protects the environment from damage, and not special interest groups 
from foreign competition.
318
 
Similarly, at least one commentator has stated that good-faith 
negotiations toward multilateral environmental agreements would be 
enough to satisfy the chapeau.
319
 
 
 
313
 See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 410. 
 
314
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 166, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm; see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 14, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 
315
 Id. 
 
316
 Ghei, supra note 49, at 148; Gavin Goh asserts that member states cannot discriminate 
between exporting countries merely on the basis of whether they have ratified the Kyoto Protocol—
this supports the emphasis on function over form explained by Ghei. Goh, supra note 15, at 418. 
 
317
 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds58_e.htm. 
 
318
 Ghei, supra note 49, at 150. 
 
319
 See Green, supra note 30, at 179. 
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In Shrimp—Turtle, the United States had regional agreements in 
place with some trading partners that allowed for specific local 
alternatives to the regulations spelled out in the United States 
Endangered Species Act.
320
 This caused problems with GATT because 
some nations were being treated more favorably, implying arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination. As demonstrated in Reformulated Gasoline, 
the WTO appears to favor multilateral over unilateral solutions to 
transboundary environmental problems.
321
 Multilateral agreements 
appeared to play an influential role in the Appellate Body‟s decision in 
Shrimp—Turtle Recourse Action. Specifically, the Appellate Body 
pointed to the preference for, rather than the necessity of, multilateral 
agreements to address transboundary environmental problems under 
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
322
 
The Appellate Body concluded in Shrimp—Turtle Recourse Action that 
the prior good-faith effort at negotiation was sufficient to convince it that 
there had been no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against 
countries without such agreements.
323
 Thus, the chapeau was satisfied. 
The most recent decision by the Appellate Body relating to the 
chapeau of Article XX (and the specific exception in Article XX(b)) 
came in the case of Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, a challenge by the 
European Commission of a Brazilian measure restricting imports of used, 
 
 
320
 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds58_e.htm. 
 
321
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996); Gentile, supra note 31, at 208-09. 
 
322
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 124, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21, 
2001), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm (“a multilateral 
approach is strongly preferred.  Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the application 
of a measure that is provisionally justified . . . it is another to require the conclusion of a multilateral 
agreement as a condition of avoiding „arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination‟ under the chapeau of 
Article XX.  We see, in this case, no such requirement.”); Dominic Gentile considers the inclusion of 
multilateral environmental agreements like the Rio Declaration in recent decisions of the Appellate 
Body to be a significant break from the WTO‟s history of avoiding the use of persuasive sources 
from outside of the WTO agreements: “This reliance on and reference to multilateral environmental 
agreements . . . in the context of a WTO dispute is especially noteworthy, and portends a new 
approach to the resolution of these types of disputes.” Gentile, supra note 31, at 223. 
 
323
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 121-122, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21, 
2001), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. It is important to 
note here that the Appellate Body did not rule that unilateral environmental measures are per se 
inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX. See Ghei, supra note 49, at 144. This potentially opens 
the door to upholding other unilateral environmental measures in WTO dispute proceeding, so long 
as market access is conditioned on effectiveness rather than adoption of identical environmental 
protections. Id. 
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retreaded tires.
324
 The Appellate Body found that the chapeau had been 
violated because the Brazilian measure allowed importers to use 
unlimited court injunctions to circumvent the import ban, which qualified 
as “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”325 Citing United States—
Gasoline and Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body held that it was 
important to examine the cause of the discrimination and the rationale 
put forward to explain its existence.
326
 The chapeau was also violated by 
an exception to the import ban that allowed imports from other South 
American countries under a separate treaty regime, leading to the 
conclusion that the Brazilian measure was both arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination
327
 and a disguised restriction on international 
trade.
328
 Specifically, the Appellate Body had “difficulty understanding 
how discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of 
Article XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate 
to the pursuit of or would go against the objective that was provisionally 
found to justify a measure under a paragraph of Article XX.”329 
E. QUALIFYING A GREENHOUSE-GAS-BASED BTA UNDER AN 
ARTICLE XX EXCEPTION 
No case has yet come before a GATT or WTO panel that explicitly 
involved applying an Article XX exception to a measure involving 
BTAs. Therefore, it is necessary to extrapolate from available WTO and 
GATT precedent to craft an analysis supporting the use of BTAs that is 
consistent with past decisions. Shrimp—Turtle and Asbestos show that 
unilateral trade measures like BTAs can qualify for Article XX 
exceptions.
330
 Both cases illustrate the successful application of Article 
XX exceptions, Shrimp—Turtle under Article XX(g) and Asbestos under 
Article XX(b). 
 
 
324
 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 1, 
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds332_e.htm. 
 
325
 Id. at ¶ 246. 
 
326
 Id. at ¶ 226. 
 
327
 Id. at ¶ 233. 
 
328
 Id. at ¶ 239. 
 
329
 Id. at ¶ 227. 
 
330
 In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body did not rule that unilateral environmental measures 
are per se inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX. This potentially opens the door to upholding 
other unilateral environmental measures in WTO dispute proceeding, so long as market access is 
conditioned on effectiveness rather than adoption of identical environmental protections. Ghei, supra 
note 49, at 144,147. 
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i. Greenhouse-Gas-Based BTAs and Article XX(b) Exceptions 
Under Article XX(b), a GHG-based BTA would have to be found to 
protect life or health and be the least trade-restrictive option available. 
Because global climate change is a transboundary problem that plainly 
threatens human, animal, and plant life and health, an import BTA 
should have no problem satisfying this first step. This is particularly true 
considering that under the Appellate Body‟s ruling in Asbestos, 
individual governments can determine at what level they wish to protect 
the health of their citizens.
331
 Moreover, international recognition of 
anthropogenic climate change as a scientifically based threat has long 
been accorded the level of acceptance necessary for trade measures that 
address it to succeed under an Article XX(b) exception.
332
 
BTAs on exports are more difficult to justify than BTAs on imports 
under this rationale because of the argument that the primary rationale 
for BTA export measures is to address competitive disadvantages faced 
by domestic industry rather than to directly prevent climate change. 
Relieving domestic producers of the cost of GHG-based regulations is a 
bit of a backwards approach to encouraging them to reduce GHG 
emissions. A rationale based on the prevention of carbon leakage—
penalizing profits from international trade could have the effect of 
limiting carbon leakage if such profits sufficiently outweigh the cost of 
moving production facilities to unregulated countries—might be 
convincing enough to justify a BTA on exports, especially if it could be 
shown that there was some attempt at a balance between keeping 
domestic industry from leaving and regulating GHG emission, but such a 
conclusion is far from certain. 
A WTO decisional body could move in one of two directions on this 
issue—either treating import and export BTAs as part of a single 
measure for the purposes of their Article XX(b) analysis, or treating them 
separately. Thus, analysis of what constitutes a measure for the purposes 
of Article XX—an issue addressed in Reformulated Gasoline—is 
necessary. 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated that for an 
Article XX analysis a “measure” is simply that part of a rule or 
regulation that is found to be in conflict with Article III:4.
333
 This leaves 
 
 
331
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm. 
 
332
 See Goh, supra note 15, at 414. 
 
333
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 8, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
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some limited discretion while establishing a narrow reading of what parts 
of a rule the WTO has authority to challenge. If export BTAs for GHGs 
fail to qualify for an exception standing alone, they could be included as 
part of the same measure as import BTAs. This is a result championed by 
Ismer and Neuhoff: under their symmetric treatment rationale, export 
BTAs could qualify for an exception on the weight of the arguments in 
favor of import BTAs.
334
 
This debate may well encompass a distinction without a 
difference—as stated earlier, export BTAs are historically easier to 
justify under WTO jurisprudence than import BTAs anyway, and a WTO 
decisional body might simply not find a violation of the substantive 
portions of GATT where export BTAs are concerned. If a violation is 
found, a decisional body may find that export BTAs qualify for an 
Article XX(g) exception. Either of these options would render the above 
debate a purely academic exercise. 
ii. Greenhouse-Gas-Based BTAs and Article XX(g) Exceptions 
In order to qualify under XX(g), the purpose of a GHG-based BTA 
must be directly connected to a legitimate conservation policy for 
exhaustible natural resources and made in conjunction with domestic 
restrictions. This second requirement should be met because the amount 
of tax applied by a BTA must be calculated based on the costs of 
domestic regulation. As stated earlier, in order to be allowed as a BTA 
under GATT, border adjustments for imported goods must be tied to 
domestic tax levels such that imports do not suffer unjust discrimination. 
For the first requirement, the WTO would have to determine that the 
GHG-based BTA was aimed at preventing climate change rather than at 
protecting domestic industry. A BTA for the costs of GHG regulation 
would raise the cost of energy-intensive products and consequentially 
encourage increases in energy efficiency and discourage carbon 
leakage—all of which should qualify as legitimate conservation 
purposes.
335
 Based on the Appellate Body‟s ruling in Shrimp—Turtle, 
measures aimed at pressuring other governments to change their 
domestic policies can be legitimate (thus limiting, if not outright 
overruling, the GATT Panel‟s decision in Tuna—Dolphin II336).337 It is 
 
 
334
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 150. 
 
335
 Veel, supra note 32, at 777. 
 
336
 The Panel in Tuna—Dolphin II concluded that the embargo was not related to conservation 
because it was based on pressuring foreign governments into satisfying the conservation goals of the 
United States—a murky line of reasoning based perhaps on a concept of causality not explicitly 
present in Article XX(g) itself. See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of 
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even possible that stating in a BTA measure‟s preamble that it was 
primarily aimed at preventing or redressing climate change would be 
enough, absent demonstrated mendacity, to convince a WTO decisional 
body that the measure was aimed at a legitimate conservation purpose. 
This rationale, combined with those concerning carbon leakage 
described above, might be enough to obtain a XX(g) exception for a 
GHG-based export BTA as well. However, many questions remain 
concerning export BTAs and GHGs as product inputs, so whether they 
would qualify for any Article XX exception is uncertain. In the end, the 
question of whether the rebate of costs associated with GHG regulation 
is primarily aimed at conservation or protectionist purposes might well 
be decided against such a measure because the goal of protecting 
domestic industry is so central to the BTA concept. On the other hand, 
strong domestic GHG regulations could imply that the primary goal of 
BTAs is to protect GHG friendly industry rather than domestic industry. 
As stated above, however, an export BTA might not require an Article 
XX exception at all. 
An exhaustible-natural-resources analysis would have to analyze 
GHG emissions as impacting exhaustible natural resources through 
climate change. Perhaps the closest available analogy to climate change 
is clean air, which was addressed in Reformulated Gasoline by a WTO 
Panel (though the Appellate Body did not reach the issue in its 
analysis).
338
 In that case, Venezuela argued that clean air could not be an 
exhaustible natural resource because it was both renewable and regularly 
changed in quality.
339
 In response, the Panel found that it made sense to 
interpret the term exhaustible natural resource “very broadly.”340 
The exhaustible-natural-resource requirement will not be an 
obstacle to a XX(g) exception for a GHG-based BTA.
341
 Indeed, there 
has been no successful challenge to the use of an Article XX(g) 
 
Tuna, ¶ 5.24, DS29/R (June 16, 1994), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ 
tunadolphinII.pdf. 
 
337
 It is important to note that the hypothesis that unilateral measures can be used to pressure 
foreign governments into policy changes has yet to be tested in the climate-change arena, with its 
unique problems of causation as a result of the cumulative impact of greenhouse gases. 
 
338
 See, e.g., Veel, supra note 32, at 776. 
 
339
 Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 386. 
 
340
 Id. at 386-87. 
 
341
 Id. at 388 (“It seems clear, based on the Appellate Body‟s broad construction in United 
States—Gasoline and its analysis in Shrimp-Turtle, that the element of „exhaustible natural 
resources‟ will not be the biggest hurdle for a country to successfully argue that a measure is 
justified under XX(g).”); see also Veel, supra note 32, at 776 (“[g]iven that anthropogenic climate 
change is perhaps the predominant contemporary environmental concern, it seems likely [that this] 
criterion would be satisfied”). 
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exception on the grounds that the thing protected was not an exhaustible 
natural resource.
342
 According to Ozbirn, “[t]his creates a general rule 
that anything that can be depleted is exhaustible, and what is a „natural 
resource‟ must be interpreted as understood internationally at the time of 
the dispute.”343 Veel agrees, saying that “it seems likely that an 
atmosphere without excessive amounts of CO2 can be characterized as an 
exhaustible natural resource.”344 Therefore, global carbon and other GHG 
concentrations could qualify as exhaustible natural resources under the 
meaning of Article XX(g)
345—as could coastlines (lost to sea-level rise), 
fresh water, predictable rainfall and climate patterns, ice and glaciers, 
biodiversity and ecosystems, etc.
346
 This conclusion is further supported 
by the Appellate Body‟s interpretation of “natural resource” under 
Article XX(g) as dynamic—incorporating international norms from 
multilateral environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol.
347
 
Some commentators claim that WTO member states will try to 
justify trade discrimination in the context of climate change through 
Article XX(g), based on an argument that the process and production 
measures used as a basis for discrimination are harmful to an exhaustible 
natural resource, namely the world climate system.
348
 This is the danger 
various decisions of the Appellate Body have addressed under an 
analysis of the chapeau of Article XX, especially Brazil—Retreaded 
Tyres and Shrimp—Turtle, discussed in the next section. 
iii. Greenhouse-Gas-Based BTAs and the Chapeau of Article XX 
As previously stated, the two primary requirements of the chapeau 
are that a measure not be arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory, and 
that it not be a disguised restriction on international trade. The Appellate 
 
 
342
 See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 388-89. 
 
343
 Id. at 388. Ozbirn bases this conclusion on the statement of the Appellate Body that its task 
in deciding Shrimp—Turtle was to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional 
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general “context of international law.” Id. Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 158, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds58_e.htm. 
 
344
 Veel, supra note 32, at 776. 
 
345
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 151. 
 
346
 For instance, Slayde Hawkins refers to “our climate resource” as an exhaustible natural 
resource. Hawkins, supra note 33, at 446. 
 
347
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 130-1, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm; see also Green, supra note 30, at 183. 
 
348
 See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376. 
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Body made it clear in Shrimp—Turtle that building flexibility into 
measures based on foreign regulatory efforts is the key to WTO 
compliance. Therefore, the design of a BTA for GHGs must focus border 
adjustment triggering conditions on the effectiveness of foreign GHG 
regulation rather than demanding that other countries institute identical 
systems of regulation. 
BTAs for greenhouse gases would both have an impact on, and be 
impacted by, any number of regional trade agreements, not to mention 
individual negotiations over tariff rates and greenhouse-gas abatement 
measures. This raises a potential pitfall faced by BTA measures that treat 
different exporting countries differently, as witnessed by the conclusions 
of the Appellate Body in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres. But so long as these 
differences are not arbitrary or unjustifiable—in other words, so long as 
there is a comprehensive and rational system in place for assessing tax 
adjustments at the border—there is no reason why a GHG-based BTA 
must run afoul of this provision of the chapeau. 
Care would have to be taken in circumstances similar to those in 
Shrimp—Turtle—where the regulating country has negotiated alternative 
agreements with some governments but not with others—to allow equal 
access to negotiated alternatives.
349
 But as the Appellate Body stated in 
Shrimp—Turtle, only a good-faith effort at negotiation is necessary, not a 
resulting agreement.
350
 According to Ismer and Neuhoff, the intensive 
negotiating history of climate summits and discussions would be more 
than enough to satisfy this requirement.
351
 However, Goh cautions that 
mere “participation in multilateral negotiations does not by itself provide 
an importing Member carte blanche to impose trade restrictive measures 
such as energy tax adjustments,” asserting that importers have an 
obligation under Article XX to pursue negotiations.
352
 
III. PLANNED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS 
To date, there are no Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) specifically 
targeted at greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, nor are there any for 
 
 
349
 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 172-3,  
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds58_e.htm. 
 
350
 Id. 
 
351
 See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 152. However, they note that this view is not 
universally held. Id. (citing Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax 
Adjustments at the Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395 (2004)). 
 
352
 Goh, supra note 15, at 417-18. 
63
Eichenberg: Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:27 AM 
346 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 3 
energy inputs used in the production process.
353
 However, there are 
several economic and regional sectors where BTAs have been 
proposed.
354
 For instance, countries that apply domestic taxes to fossil 
fuels as a fiscal measure often apply a BTA to imports of like fuels.
355
 
Recently proposed climate legislation in the United States includes a 
“competitiveness provision” or “international reserve allowances” 
designed along the lines of a BTA.
356
 Additionally, a report prepared for 
the Japanese Environment Agency suggests that BTAs might be 
advisable where products are exchanged with countries that do not take 
economic measures to protect the environment similar to those taken by 
Japan.
357
 Finally, there are some proposals, published in academic 
circles, for economically feasible BTAs for greenhouse gases.
358
 Because 
the evidence of the threat posed by climate change continues to grow, it 
seems likely that GHG-based BTAs will start cropping up in GHG-
regulating states sometime in the near future.
359
 
Some point out that companies in the United States enjoy a 
significant competitive advantage due to the lack of GHG regulation, and 
suggest that to the extent this disadvantages European Union (EU) 
companies, the EU should impose border tax adjustments equal to GHG 
costs faced by domestic producers to level the playing field.
360
 In fact, 
there is increasing pressure from industrial producers in the EU to 
impose carbon tariffs in response to the failure of the United States to 
comply with Kyoto targets.
361
 According to the World Bank, “the 
potential impact of such punitive measures by the EU could result in a 
loss of about 7 percent in U.S. exports to the EU,” with energy intensive 
industries suffering as much as a 30-percent loss.
362
 These industries 
include heavy industrial sectors like the cement industry, aluminum 
manufacturers, and steel producers. Though there have been no 
 
 
353
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 24. 
 
354
 Goh, supra note 15, at 399. 
 
355
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 24. 
 
356
 See, e.g., Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. (as 
placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008). 
 
357
 Goh, supra note 15, at 400. 
 
358
 See, e.g.,Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8. 
 
359
 See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 291; Veel, supra note 32, at, 776-777. 
 
360
 See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 378; see also Goh, supra note 15, at 400; Green & 
Epps, supra note 135, at 287. 
 
361
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 12. 
 
362
 Id. Though its use of the word “punitive” is clearly pejorative, it reflects commonly held 
free-trade principles that hold that limitations on trade are bad. The World Bank could have stated 
that such tariffs were fair or self-protective, had they approached the issue from a different point of 
view. 
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documented results that support the perception that high energy taxes 
have a negative impact on economic competitiveness, serious efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions would almost certainly result in much higher 
energy costs than those imposed by normal energy taxes because such a 
large percentage of GHG emissions come from energy generation.
363
 
Higher costs are exactly what domestic industries are afraid of, and why 
BTAs would serve a valuable function facilitating GHG regulation. 
A. SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES 
There are a broad range of environmental taxes that could be used to 
restrict GHG emissions, including carbon taxes, energy taxes, and fuel 
taxes, and taxes on air emissions, chemical processes, feedstock 
chemicals, waste disposal, and water pollution. The wide range of these 
examples highlights the difficulties faced by regulators attempting to find 
a comprehensive body of international legal precedent to guide the 
design of BTAs. Where the item taxed is physically incorporated into a 
final product, such as feedstock chemicals into a final chemical product, 
the weight of WTO law stands behind allowing BTAs.
364
 However, the 
law surrounding input or process taxes, such as air pollution, energy 
efficiency, waste disposal, and sustainable harvesting practices, is 
significantly more uncertain.
365
 
It could be very difficult administratively to quantify the exact level 
of taxes appropriate for BTAs addressed to the costs of domestic GHG 
regulation.
366
 So many different activities produce GHGs, and so many 
of those activities are taxed in one form or another that the complex 
practicalities of formulating fair BTAs in this context cause some to 
dismiss the prospect of a functional GHG-based BTA all together. These 
problems include such issues as identifying the carbon content of traded 
goods—especially where exporting countries have little incentive to 
cooperate or resent the imperialist overtones of border tax regimes—or 
where tracing the content of a particular GHG tax, such as a tax on the 
methane produced by cows being traced in proportion in the cow‟s meat, 
hide, hooves, etc.
367
 Additional problems may arise because of the large 
 
 
363
 Goh, supra note 15, at 400. 
 
364
 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported 
Substances, L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 5, 1987), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
gt47ds_e.htm. 
 
365
 See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 59. 
 
366
 Id. at 32. 
 
367
 See, e.g., Goh, supra note 15, at 422; see also Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 
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range of energy production technologies in use and the difficulties faced 
by administrators attempting to set average levels based on predominant 
methods of production.
368
 
If the calculation of GHG inputs for individual products is 
problematic, so too is the calculation of how much of a particular tax on 
product inputs is actually passed along to consumers. This is similar to 
our earlier discussion of the economic rationales for the direct/indirect 
tax distinction—such difficulties implicate an inherent risk of double 
taxation and other forms of trade inefficiency. However, some claim that 
by limiting tax adjustments only to inputs physically incorporated or 
present in the final product, this kind of inefficiency can be avoided.
369
 
There is some flexibility in WTO rules where such practicalities are 
concerned. The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments commented 
that some taxes presented difficulties in “calculating exactly the amount 
of compensation,” but that “it was administratively sensible and 
sufficiently accurate to rebate by average rates for a given class of 
goods.”370 Predominant methods of domestic production, for instance, 
could be used to calculate the GHG content of imported products.
371
 
This, at least, presents one avenue for the practical design of a GHG-
based BTA. 
Additionally, information about things like energy inputs and 
efficiency should be readily available to product manufacturing firms. As 
Demaret points out, “a company which does not know such information 
is not in a position to ensure that it is using the most efficient and 
productive combination of inputs.”372 Government requirements that 
such information be provided to regulators might not be as difficult to 
comply with as an initial glance at the problem implies, especially where 
providing such information is financially in the best interest of 
manufacturers. For imports, GHG certificates could be required to 
accompany products. Alternatively, assumptions could be made 
concerning predominant production methods, a strategy that survived 
 
32; Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 380-81. 
 
368
 See Goh, supra note 15, at 422, (citing Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on 
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 5, 1987), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm). 
 
369
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 32. 
 
370
 In particular, the Working Party pointed to cascade tax systems: “For adjustment, countries 
operating cascade systems usually resorted to calculating average rates of rebate for categories of 
products rather than calculating the actual tax levied on a particular product.” Report of the Working 
Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 16, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/ 
reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. 
 
371
 Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 380-81. 
 
372
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 33. 
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GATT review in United States—Superfund.373 
B. A PROPOSAL FOR AN ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE BORDER TAX 
ADJUSTMENT 
Ismer and Neuhoff have constructed a model BTA based on Best 
Available Technology (BAT) in order to avoid discrimination against 
foreign producers.
374
 They claim that a “BTA scheme with reference 
technology levels set at BAT would . . . be admissible under WTO-
rules.”375 In order to arrive at this conclusion, Ismer and Neuhoff follow 
the view that products should be considered “like” regardless of 
production methods; they thus claim that the only way to successfully 
qualify such a BTA would be to use the lowest GHG related charge 
incurred by any domestic producer.
376
 This charge should be assessed 
assuming that all components of a product have been manufactured using 
BAT
377
 because it would be administratively prohibitive to determine a 
BTA for every product according to the amount of GHG its production 
actually emits.
378
 
Estimates in this model would rely on calculation of the average 
amount of GHG generated by the production of raw materials. Ismer and 
Neuhoff concentrate on simplicity, suggesting that, at least in the 
beginning, certain thresholds be established to exclude raw materials that 
produce relatively low levels of GHG.
379
 The burden of reporting 
quantities of basic materials consumed during production would lie with 
producers.
380
 Electricity inputs would be addressed separately by 
compensating only for changes in overall price because of the 
interconnected regional nature of the world‟s energy grids.381 This model 
would conservatively calculate the GHG content of a product for the 
purpose of tax remissions, and the remission would be the same 
 
 
373
 Id. 
 
374
 Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 155. 
 
375
 Id. at 152. 
 
376
 Id. at 147. 
 
377
 Ismer and Neuhoff define BAT as “the most effective and advanced stage in the 
development of activities and their methods of operations which indicate the practical suitability for 
providing in principle the basis for emission limit values designed to prevent and, where that is not 
practicable, generally to reduce emissions and the impact on the environment as a whole.” Id. This, 
they argue, is the only really feasible way to calculate a BTA that would also be compatible with 
GATT Articles I and III ¶ 2. Id. at 148. 
 
378
 Id. at 153. 
 
379
 Id. 
 
380
 Id. 
 
381
 Id. at 154. 
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regardless of how the product was actually produced.
382
 
A BAT system has to set an appropriate level for its taxes and 
ensure that individual firms cannot define new BAT simply through the 
construction of a new facility. One solution for this problem is to define 
BAT through the market share a given technology holds and to ensure 
that the BAT standard covers several related products.
383
 In fact, Ismer 
and Neuhoff recommend entrusting BAT determinations to an 
independent body informed by both domestic and foreign industry.
384
 
Ismer and Neuhoff‟s model demonstrates that there are 
administratively efficient and economically feasible methodologies for 
instituting a BTA related to the costs of domestic GHG regulation. There 
are potential difficulties with a BAT model, like the practicalities of 
determining what the BAT actually is and the potential inherent in any 
such process for perverse economic incentives, for instance. Also 
troubling is the necessity for additional regulatory institutions that would 
make economic policy decisions about taxes on imports. Nevertheless, 
this remains a viable model and an answer to those who claim that the 
complexities of a BTA that would reflect GHG emissions overwhelm the 
potential usefulness of such a BTA. 
C. THE “COMPETITIVENESS PROVISION” IN PROPOSED CLIMATE 
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
For many of the competitiveness, carbon leakage, and political 
economy concerns expressed in the opening section of this Article, the 
United States is considering what is referred to as a “competitiveness 
provision” in currently proposed climate legislation.385 Essentially, this 
provision would be a BTA based on the costs to producers of GHG 
reductions. The proposed measures would apply only to goods 
manufactured in countries that are major emitters of GHGs and that have 
failed to implement sufficient emissions-reduction measures of their 
own.
386
 
America‟s Climate Security Act of 2007387 and the Low Carbon 
 
 
382
 Id. at 145. 
 
383
 Id. at 143. 
 
384
 Id. at 147. 
 
385
 See, e.g., Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (as 
reported in the Senate on Oct. 18, 2007); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. 
(as introduced in the Senate on July 11, 2007). 
 
386
 Ponnambalam, supra note 42, at 265-66. 
 
387
 Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (as reported in the 
Senate on Oct. 18, 2007). 
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Economy Act of 2007,
388
 though neither was passed into law, would 
have conditioned access to markets in the United States on the purchase 
of GHG emissions allowances, sometimes called “international reserve 
allowances,” or would have provided cash or securities equivalent to the 
purchase price of such allowances,
389
 except where the exporting country 
had comparable GHG restrictions in place.
390
 One commentator, Slayde 
Hawkins, believes that these provisions would have violated the 
nondiscrimination clauses of GATT Article I and III, because they 
differentiate between like products on the basis of GHGs produced 
during the production process (in other words, on the basis of PPMs). 
But Hawkins asserts that they would nevertheless qualify for exception 
under Article XX(b) and (g).
391
 Hawkins claims that the chapeau of 
Article XX is satisfied by the preference of the American climate 
measures for negotiations and their acceptance of comparable action 
from trading partners rather than identical GHG reduction measures.
392
 
The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 demonstrates 
four areas of particular interest to a discussion of the practical 
foundations of a BTA related to domestic GHG regulation: (1) the 
definition of which goods are required to purchase internal reserve 
allowances—the equivalent of a BTA, (2) the criteria by which an 
importing country‟s GHG regulations are evaluated to determine if that 
country‟s goods will be required to purchase internal reserve allowances, 
(3) how a calculation of the cost of internal reserve allowances is to be 
arrived at, and (4) the methodology for calculating the number of internal 
reserve allowances that must be purchased.
393
 These four mechanisms are 
integral to the practical analysis of a GHG-based BTA‟s compliance with 
WTO law. 
Covered goods are defined as primary products that directly or 
indirectly generate a substantial quantity of GHGs during manufacturing 
and are “closely related” to goods affected by the requirements of the 
 
 
388
 Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate on 
July 11, 2007). 
 
389
 Veel, supra note 32, at 763.  This provision for securities or cash equivalents was an 
alteration added in 2008. Id. 
 
390
 Hawkins, supra note 33. 
 
391
 Id. at 441-42. Hawkins further points out that “if a covered sector in a country without 
comparable GHG restrictions in place emits much more GHGs overall than the same sector in the 
U.S., „like‟ products from the foreign country will be required to purchase many more GHG 
emissions allowances than their U.S. counterparts . . . . [F]oreign products in that situation face more 
onerous requirements under the program.” Id. at 443.  This implies a violation of GATT Article III. 
Id. at 443. 
 
392
 Id. at 448. 
 
393
 Veel, supra note 32, at 763-64. 
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Climate Security Act.
394
 “Closely related” is probably equivalent to a 
like-product analysis under GATT and ensures that like goods are treated 
the same. One potential problem pointed out by Veel is that domestic 
producers that emit less than 10,000 carbon dioxide equivalents a year 
are exempt, while foreign producers are not party to this de minimis 
threshold.
395
 However, this is a very low threshold and may not actually 
have a practical impact on imports.
396
 
Covered goods are exempt from the requirements of the legislation 
if the exporting country is determined to have taken comparable actions 
to limit GHG emissions, has been identified by the United Nations “as 
among the least-developed of developing countries,” or whose share of 
GHG emissions fall below a de minimis threshold not more than 0.5 
percent of total global emissions.
397
 All of these criteria raise significant 
problems with GATT Article I:1‟s Most Favored Nations clause398 and 
would probably necessitate the use of an Article XX exemption. For the 
exemption to be available, the definition of comparable action must 
comply with the case law described earlier concerning arbitrary 
discrimination and comparable action in the Shrimp—Turtle series of 
cases. As Veel points out, the comparable-action requirement “imposes 
very few requirements on the form that a state‟s actions must take in 
reducing greenhouse gases in order to be considered [comparable].”399 
This flexibility is of vital importance to compliance with GATT Article 
XX exemptions, since balanced and rational decision making plus the 
ability to negotiate are distinct components of the Appellate Body‟s case 
law. 
The price of international reserve allowances is established for each 
year at the most recent allowance auction and cannot exceed the market 
price of domestic allowances.
400
 This ensures that the BTA does not 
 
 
394
 Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., § 6001(5) (as 
placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008). 
 
395
 Veel, supra note 32, at 765. 
 
396
 Id. at 765. 
 
397
 Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., § 6006(b)(2)(A-
B),(c)(4)(B) (as placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008). 
 
398
 See Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, GATT Tokyo Round, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903). However, 
exempting countries identified as least developed might qualify under the terms of the Enabling 
Clause, which allows developed countries to offer more favorable treatment to the developing 
economies without according like treatment to other WTO members. Id.; see also Veel, supra note 
32, at 785-86. 
 
399
 Id. at 767. 
 
400
 Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., § 6006(a)(3)(A-
B) (as placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008). 
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exceed the tax assessed on domestic production and that it has been made 
in conjunction with domestic legislation, both WTO requirements for 
BTAs. Additionally, the proceeds from the sale of international reserve 
allowances is earmarked for climate-change adaptation efforts in 
“disadvantaged communities in other countries.”401 This stipulation acts 
as an argument against claims of protectionist practices and militates for 
an interpretation of the legislation as possessing a significant nexus with 
conservation purposes. 
The quantity of international reserve allowances required for each 
type of good is to be established through a general formula based on the 
GHG emissions produced by the manufacture of that good in the country 
in question and adjusted to take into account free allocation of domestic 
allowances, general GHG emissions from that particular industry sector, 
and the level of economic development in the exporting country.
402
 
Under this proposed legislation, the importation of all covered goods 
must be accompanied by written declarations of either excluded status or 
sufficient international reserve allowances to cover the goods.
403
 The 
potentially dangerous aspect of this methodology is that the BTA is not 
assessed based on an approximation of the actual GHG emissions that 
result from the production of the covered good; rather, the BTA is 
assessed based on the total GHG emissions for certain types of goods in 
the exporting country. Thus, foreign producers are not treated identically 
to domestic producers, whose GHG tax is assessed based on actual 
emissions.
404
 However, as stated earlier, domestic and foreign taxes do 
not have to be exactly the same, just roughly equivalent. In Reformulated 
Gasoline, Venezuelan producers were able to show that the 
methodologies for calculating domestic tax rates were more favorable 
than the methodologies for calculating tax rates for foreign products—
importers assessed a GHG-based BTA would have to similarly prove that 
they were disadvantaged when compared with domestic producers. The 
question of whether the methodologies for calculating domestic and 
foreign GHG allowance requirements are roughly equivalent is a 
determination that will probably end up with the Appellate Body. 
 
 
401
 Id. at § 6006(a)(7). 
 
402
 Id. at § 6006(d)(1)(A)-(B). 
 
403
 Id. at § 6006(c)(1)-(2)(A)-(B). 
 
404
 Veel, supra note 32, at 769. 
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D. POTENTIAL WEAKENING EFFECTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION FROM BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
Subsidies can actually have a weakening effect on environmental 
regulation. As Andrew Green points out in his 2006 article, “a subsidy 
may lead to an „informational cascade,‟ overcoming information 
constraints and potentially bounded rationality.”405 Applying this analysis 
to BTAs, we can look at the possibility of a cascading effect as a result of 
market distortions from tax adjustments. In other words, people who 
might normally be inclined to purchase domestic products because of the 
perception that such products are produced in a more environmentally 
sustainable manner may no longer do so. Additionally, BTAs assume 
that people will buy the cheapest product available—otherwise it would 
not be so important to protect domestic industry from an influx of 
environmentally suspect cheap products. This line of reasoning could 
weaken a like-product analysis that was based on consumer 
preferences—consumers who assume that the environmental slate has 
been wiped clean by BTAs will be less likely to differentiate based on 
environmental practices. 
Some worry that GHG-based BTAs may reduce incentives for 
exporting countries to regulate climate change themselves, or to 
strengthen such regulations, because of the potential of such regulation to 
disadvantage exports.
406
 However, a BTA regime that took into account 
the GHG-regulation efforts of exporting countries—perhaps based on the 
model provided by Shrimp—Turtle so as to ensure that it would survive 
WTO review—would significantly reduce such worries. The Appellate 
body in Shrimp—Turtle held that it was necessary to strike a balance 
between the needs of other member states and the regulating state‟s need 
to protect limited natural resources.
407
 If a GHG-based BTA wishes to 
qualify for an Article XX exception it will probably need some sort of 
balanced treatment along the lines of the regulatory effort at issue in 
Shrimp—Turtle. 
There is worry that environmental BTAs could have a distorting 
effect on international trade, threatening the principles of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration. The Rio Declaration, almost universally accepted as 
containing many of the guiding principles of international environmental 
 
 
405
 Green, supra note 83, at 429. 
 
406
 See, e.g., Goh, supra note 15, at 405. 
 
407
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 149, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21, 
2001), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. 
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law, emphasizes the necessity of internalizing environmental costs and 
avoiding distortional effects to international trade.
408
 Such worries might 
be assuaged by the ability of the WTO to adapt to international norms 
like those promulgated by the Rio Declaration. In Shrimp—Turtle, the 
Appellate Body found that the term “natural resource” was dynamic and 
could thus adapt over time to changing international norms.
409
 The 
Appellate Body relied on international law to define the framework of 
GATT, so Shrimp—Turtle could stand for the proposition that GATT 
should be interpreted in light of prevailing norms of international law.
410
 
The WTO Panel decision in EC—Biotech might limit the scope of 
this holding from Shrimp—Turtle. Even though EC—Biotech was never 
appealed to the Appellate Body, it was adopted by the Dispute 
Settlement Body. While acknowledging that “the mere fact that one or 
more disputing parties are not parties to a convention does not 
necessarily mean that a convention cannot shed light on the meaning and 
scope of a treaty term to be interpreted,”411 the Panel in EC—Biotech 
distinguished Shrimp—Turtle on the grounds that the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol were not relevant to the 
interpretation of the WTO agreements in dispute.
412
 When the ordinary 
meaning of the WTO Agreement is clear, the Panel found, WTO Panels 
are not obligated to rely on other rules of international law.
413
 EC—
Biotech did affirm, though, that the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties applies to WTO interpretations.
414
 Again, the Appellate Body 
has not reviewed the conclusions of EC—Biotech and is under no 
obligation to adopt the legal conclusions of a WTO Panel, and this 
particular finding is not particularly detailed or thoroughly explained. 
Therefore, taking international norms and principles into account could 
still be necessary to survive WTO review. 
 
 
408
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16 (June 14, 1992), available 
at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163&l=en. 
 
409
 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 130, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. 
 
410
 Id. Indeed, the Appellate Body references the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, The Convention on Biological Diversity, Agenda 21, the Resolution on Assistance to 
Developing Countries, and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals. Id.; see also Goh, supra note 15, at 419. 
 
411
 Report of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.94, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006), 
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm. 
 
412
 Id. at ¶ 7.95. 
 
413
 Id. at ¶ 7.93. 
 
414
 Id. at ¶ 7.92. 
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IV. THE RESULT OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS: THE STICK 
Getting trade policy and environmental policy to mesh in an 
efficient way is tremendously important to the health of both the global 
economy and the environment. One of the underlying dysfunctions of 
environmental protection is that environmental regulation all over the 
world has been co-opted by domestic industry lobbyists, and most 
regulatory efforts are currently sculpted to favor domestic producers at a 
high overall cost to the effectiveness of environmental measures as well 
as to the international economic system. In 1994, Michael Leidy and 
Bernard Hoekman noted a disturbing tendency to reject the most efficient 
environmental regulatory regime in favor of less efficient options 
involving governmentally administered sector-specific protection from 
foreign competition.
415
 Such choices result in more market-failure-
inducing externalities and higher net societal costs for environmental 
protection. Leidy and Hoekman blame this tendency on a confluence of 
the interests of import-competing polluters,
416
 environmental groups,
417
 
labor, and even foreign importers—all of whom are interested in the 
heightened trade restrictions likely to accompany inefficient 
environmental regulation.
418
 In fact, Leidy and Hoekman suspect that 
there is an “endogeneity419 of trade barriers to environmental 
regulations . . . [that] may influence interest-group preferences for 
alternative environmental policies.”420 Nita Ghei also believes that “both 
legitimate environmental concerns and illegitimate protectionist rent-
seeking can result in the use of environmental standards as trade 
 
 
415
 Leidy & Hoekman, supra note 27; see also Ghei, supra note 49, at 130-32. 
 
416
 Leidy and Hoekman point out that the “[i]ndustries facing the highest pollution-abatement 
costs are among those most frequently seeking and receiving protection in industrialized countries.” 
Id. at 243. Examples include the Australian chemical industry and the American cement industry, 
among others. Id. 
 
417
 Id. at 251. A regulatory approach is superior from the environmentalist‟s perspective 
because quantity-based approaches guarantee reductions in pollution, while tax-based approaches do 
not. Id. at 251-52. 
 
418
 Id. at 242. 
 
419
 In an economic model, a parameter or variable are said to be endogenous when there is a 
correlation between the parameter or variable and the error term. Endogeneity can arise as a result of 
measurement error, autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneity, omitted variables, and 
sample selection errors. For example, in a simple supply and demand model, when predicting the 
quantity demanded in equilibrium, the price is endogenous because producers change their price in 
response to demand and consumers change their demand in response to price. In contrast, a change 
in consumer tastes or preferences would be an exogenous change on the demand curve. In this case, 
the price variable is said to have total endogeneity once the demand and supply curves are known. 
 
420
 Leidy and Hoekman, supra note 27, at 244. 
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barriers.”421 
Protectionist temptations are the danger that WTO jurisprudence 
sets out to protect against. In Reformulated Gasoline, for example, 
challenged trade measures had many of the features economists associate 
with inefficient environmental regimes of the type preferred by domestic 
industry as protectionist measures.
422
 Therefore, it is important to analyze 
the policy implications of BTAs and the overall tendency for such 
instruments to be co-opted by protectionist interests so that these pitfalls 
can be avoided as much as possible. 
The United States‟ successful experiences with the accomplishment 
of conservation goals through its Superfund and ozone-depleting 
chemical (ODC) taxes show the utility of BTAs for achieving 
environmental policy goals.
423
 Duncan Brack claims that without the 
ODC tax, industry in the United States would have been snuffed out by 
international competition because of the high tax levels imposed 
domestically without any certain reduction in ODC production.
424
 
Furthermore, the Superfund and ODC experiences show that taxes on 
embodied inputs are administratively feasible and lay out some 
possibilities for addressing concerns about taxes on GHG-producing 
product inputs. 
BTAs can also play a role in circumventing systemic protectionist 
biases and avoiding many of the pitfalls pointed out in the preceding 
paragraphs. BTAs are a viable alternative to inefficient protectionist 
regulation because they address concerns about unfair trade advantages 
due to international competition from unregulated manufacturers without 
creating conditions favorable to domestic monopolies and cartel-like 
profits. While penalty taxes tend to be the most efficient instruments to 
achieve pollution abatement, firms prefer quantity regulation (with 
quotas assigned below minimum efficient scale
425
) because of the greater 
potential for cartel-like profits.
426
 In order to ensure optimal economic 
efficiency, great care must be taken when crafting BTA measures, to 
avoid putting a greater regulatory burden on importers than is necessary 
to merely level the playing field. In this way, the WTO can act to 
 
 
421
 Ghei, supra note 49, at 131. 
 
422
 The Appellate Body concluded that “the resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, 
and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable.” Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 20, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Ghei, 
supra note 49, at 140. 
 
423
 BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 79. 
 
424
 Id. 
 
425
 Leidy & Hoekman, supra note 27, at 247. 
 
426
 Id. at 244. 
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incentivize fair and balanced BTA measures by finding arbitrary 
discrimination where BTAs fail to meet this standard. So constructed, 
BTAs could be a vital tool to defuse pressures brought to bear by 
domestic industry and labor in support of quantity-based restrictions and 
protectionist measures.
427
 
Unilateral trade measures aimed at protecting the environment have 
been acknowledged as acceptable under GATT by the Appellate body in 
cases like Asbestos and Shrimp—Turtle. Within limits, unilateral 
measures like BTAs can be used to prevent trans-boundary 
environmental problems like climate change.
428
 After a thorough 
exploration of these limits, as has been so far compiled, what remains is 
to investigate the state of global climate governance and the role that 
BTAs can play in the effective pursuit of worldwide GHG reductions. 
A. HARMONIZATION THROUGH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL 
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND BOTTOM-UP 
CLIMATE REGIMES 
Applying a climate-tax regime broadly across states would require 
treaties to harmonize the application of prior-stage environmental 
taxes.
429
 Demaret points out that harmonization of specific taxes has 
posed tremendous difficulty in the European Union (EU), and that 
because of such difficulties it is unclear if such harmonization has any 
real potential in the international context.
430
 Bilateral treaty regimes may 
offer more concrete chances of success, as demonstrated by the United 
States in Shrimp—Turtle. Indeed, as negotiations on multilateral 
environmental agreements intended to bind every country in the world 
show increasing signs of stagnation, it is important to understand the 
types of unilateral measures countries may turn to in an effort to avoid a 
loss of momentum in the effort to address anthropogenic climate change. 
Barbara Buchner and Carlo Carraro, for instance, prefer “a bottom-up, 
country-driven approach to defining national commitments. Instead of a 
top-town, international negotiation on national emission targets, each 
country would determine its contribution to a cooperative effort to curb 
GHGs and choose the partners with whom it intends to cooperate.”431 
 
 
427
 Id. at 251. 
 
428
 See Veel, supra note 32, at 771 (“[W]hile carbon tariffs may be permissible under current 
WTO rules, this result is by no means obvious and would potentially require a justification of their 
permissibility under Article XX(g) of the GATT.”); see also Gentile, supra note 31, at 208-09. 
 
429
 Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 33. 
 
430
 Id. 
 
431
 Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs: a Cost-
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Indeed, Carraro and Christian Egenhofer believe that the near future of 
climate negotiations will result in several parallel agreements aimed at 
controlling climate change, backed up by domestic measures and policies 
implemented unilaterally or in conjunction with small groups of like-
minded countries.
432
 
Current trade and climate negotiations already result in the 
formation of regional coalitions and blocs of countries with similar 
interests, with coalitions forming between such blocs in order to secure 
special considerations.
433
 Regional and sub-regional cooperation is 
gaining importance in international law with the proliferation of free-
trade areas and customs unions. Indeed, most multilateral agreements 
begin as regional agreements of some kind.
434
 Buchner and Carraro use 
the results from economic game-theory research to conclude that it is 
unlikely that all relevant countries will sign the Kyoto Protocol, resulting 
in the emergence of alternative climate blocs.
435
 They point to potential 
cooperative agreements after 2012 resulting in, among other possibilities, 
(1) European Union-Russia and China-Japan climate blocs, with the 
United States perhaps pursuing climate policy under a NAFTA 
framework; or (2) a two-bloc coalition involving the United States with 
China and the European Union with Russia and Japan.
436
 At the 
conclusion of their book of collected essays on the subject, Carraro and 
Egenhofer conclude that sub-global climate agreements are likely to 
emerge in the near future and to be effective at addressing atmospheric 
GHG concentrations more quickly than a global regime would.
437
 
Domestic measures supporting such a regime would be designed to 
create powerful individual incentives for other countries in order to 
reduce the impact of free-rider problems. Trade measures could include 
 
Benefit Analysis of Bottom-Up Climate Regimes, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP 
APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 16, 17 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 
2007). 
 
432
 Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer, Bottom-Up Approaches to Climate Change Control: 
Some Policy Conclusions, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TOWARD 
GLOBAL AGREEMENT 116, 120 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 2007). 
 
433
 Buchner and Carraro suggest, for instance, the division of countries into Annex I and non-
Annex I blocs, the special emissions redistribution provisions secured by the European Union, and 
Australia‟s special provision on land use emissions as examples from the Kyoto Protocol. Buchner 
& Carraro, supra note 431, at 17. 
 
434
 Id. at 17-18. 
 
435
 Id. at 18-19. 
 
436
 Id. at 21-28. This final scenario is the one that the authors deem most likely to occur 
because “it causes small welfare losses for the US and China and small welfare gains for the [EU 
with Russia and Japan], while leading to a considerably enhanced environmental effectiveness of 
climate policy.” Id. at 28. 
 
437
 Carraro & Egenhofer, supra note 432, at 119. 
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BTAs, tariffs, or outright sanctions used as tools or weapons against 
countries that refuse to adopt GHG standards specified by regulating 
countries.
438
 The overarching concept behind such measures could be to 
create a bottom-up approach to defining national GHG reduction 
commitments instead of investing time and resources only in the 
completion of an omnibus multilateral environmental agreement.
439
 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) offer another route for 
countries to pursue environmental trade agendas. Problems defining 
environmental goods and services would be less of a problem under an 
RTA, and supply-side capacities and technical assistance to developing 
economies would be easier to build into such agreements.
440
 Often, 
controversial problems can be resolved more quickly at a regional level 
than at a global level, a lesson that climate negotiators would be wise to 
learn from the history of trade negotiations.
441
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As Tom Athanasiou writes, “[t]here is no choice between climate 
protection and human development. We shall have both, or we shall have 
neither.”442 And yet it is widely acknowledged that dramatic reductions 
in the emissions of developing economies are an absolute necessity for 
any long-term solution to rising atmospheric GHG concentrations.
443
 
This must be squared with the negotiating posture of the developing 
world, which firmly places economic development and the alleviation of 
poverty as top priorities.
444
 As Athanasiou points out, developing 
economies would need to reach the peak of their carbon emissions by 
2020 in order to achieve even a middle estimate of global climate safety, 
meaning that such carbon emissions would have to peak while the 
majority of the people in developing economies are still relatively quite 
poor.
445
 To state it plainly, rich countries are going to have to provide the 
technology and finances needed to develop post-GHG economies.
446
 
When addressing equity issues and climate change, it is important 
 
 
438
 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 36. 
 
439
 Buchner & Carraro, supra note 432, at 17. 
 
440
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 102. 
 
441
 Carraro & Egenhofer, supra note 432, at 120. 
 
442
 Tom Athanasiou, After the Denial, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL‟Y 23 
(2009). 
 
443
 Id. at 26-27. 
 
444
 Id. at 27. 
 
445
 Id. at 28. 
 
446
 Id. at 31. 
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not to get lost in discussions of distributive justice. As Eric Posner and 
Cass Sunstein point out, emissions reductions on the part of wealthy 
states are not the most effective method for transferring resources or 
evening out wealth disparities.
447
 Furthermore, “the climate change 
problem poorly fits the corrective justice model, because the 
consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many people who 
have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have 
not been victimized.”448 Rather, practical analysis of the tools currently 
used by countries to address climate change is required to progress 
beyond current stalemates in the multilateral climate regulatory structure. 
It is increasingly clear that multilateral climate negotiations are not 
having a significant enough impact on global climate-change mitigation 
and adaptation issues. One estimate finds that full compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol would reduce global warming by a paltry 0.03º C by 
2100.
449
 The UNFCCC‟s failure to institute explicit abatement targets for 
the primary developing country emitters of GHGs has severely 
compromised the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.
450
 It 
is not economically rational to expect the United States, despite its 
undeniable responsibility for current GHG atmospheric concentrations, 
to shoulder as much as eighty percent of the costs of an ultimately 
ineffective multilateral agreement.
451
 The two states most criticized for 
their failure to implement substantive GHG reduction targets are also the 
two states that emit the most GHGs: the United States and China.
452
 This 
is no coincidence, as these two states are motivated by strong national 
incentives to free-ride and set unilateral environmental policy rather than 
participate in multilateral negotiations, making their refusal to adopt 
binding emissions targets economically rational.
453
 Fragmentation in 
 
 
447
 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1590-91; Posner and Sunstein admit, however, that 
“desirable redistribution is more likely to occur through climate change policy than otherwise, or to 
be accomplished more effectively through climate policy than through direct foreign aid.” Id. at 
1591. 
 
448
 Id. at 1592. 
 
449
 Id. at 1575 (citing WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BONER, WARMING THE WORLD 91, 152 
(2000)). 
 
450
 Buchner & Carraro, supra note 431, at  16. 
 
451
 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1611. 
 
452
 The World‟s 12 Largest GHG Emitters, CBC News (Dec. 24, 200), available at 
www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/12/14/f-climate-dirty-dozen.html. China leads the world‟s GHG 
production with about 7,500 million metric tonnes of GHG emissions per year.  The United States 
follows closely behind with just over 7,000 million metric tonnes. Id. 
 
453
 Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Bottom-Up Climate Regimes, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP 
APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 16, 28 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 
2007). 
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global climate governance is furthered as well by the fact that the EU and 
Japan have strong incentives to keep the United States out of the demand 
side of the market, because participation by the United States would 
increase EU abatement costs.
454
 Finally, current large permit suppliers 
like Russia have strong incentives to keep potential competitors, such as 
China, out of the climate coalition for as long as possible.
455
 Buchner and 
Carraro conclude that the current climate coalition structure involving 
cooperation between the European Union, Japan, and Russia is stable in 
terms of its economic incentives, though ineffective at actually reducing 
global GHG concentrations.
456
 If multilateral climate negotiations 
continue along similar lines, which they give every indication of doing, 
and assuming that there will be continued increases in political pressure 
on governments to take substantive action, alternative climate change 
mitigation strategies must be investigated. 
As global climate governance moves forward in the face of such 
intransigent forces, international actors will begin to focus more and 
more on strategies that can be effective at motivating cooperation from 
rational free-riders and other nonparticipants. Initially, GHG reduction 
schemes were instituted in the hope that other countries would soon 
follow with similar policies. In the absence of such action, GHG 
regulators are turning to import-restrictive measures as a means to 
balance competitiveness and leakage concerns.
457
 In 2006 the French 
Prime Minister proposed the imposition of taxes on imports from 
countries that had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and in 2008 the 
President of the European Commission proposed that importers be 
required to obtain GHG allowances as required of European producers.
458
 
BTA provisions in proposed climate legislation in the United States, 
discussed previously, are another example of unilateral action to require 
importers to participate in domestic GHG regulation. 
This more individualized and fragmented approach to global climate 
governance, which is fast becoming the norm, demands attention as a 
viable and helpful alternative to unpopular hierarchical power structures 
and overarching bureaucracies. Noriko Fujiwara and Christian Egenhofer 
conclude that “[t]he best we can expect from international negotiations 
would be policy coordination, not regulatory approximation.”459 As 
 
 
454
 Id. 
 
455
 Id. at 28-29. 
 
456
 Id. at 29. 
 
457
 Veel, supra note 32, at 758. 
 
458
 Id. at 759. 
 
459
 Noriko Fujiwara & Christian Egenhofer, Do Regional Integration Approaches Hold 
Lessons for Climate Change Regime Formation? The Case of Differentiated Integration in Europe, 
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Christina Voigt points out, “fragmented normative structures” are not 
automatically indicative of failure in the arena of international law.
460
 
Therefore, bottom-up strategies such as regional agreements and 
domestic measures aimed at inducing international cooperation with 
unilateral emissions targets may represent the means to shore up 
crumbling top-down climate-governance frameworks; to those who 
believe the UNFCCC process is too slow, bottom-up methods represent 
viable alternatives to such frameworks. Buchner and Carraro conclude 
that “parallel bottom-up coalitions could be a first step toward global 
climate change control.”461 Indeed, others have noted that integrating 
climate, economic, energy, and security policies into regional agreements 
represents an increasing trend, especially in action taken by the European 
Commission.
462
 At the very least, regional climate negotiations can have 
a much bigger impact than global negotiations on the practical 
implementation of global climate goals.
463
 
There are a number of potential positive impacts that BTAs could 
have on global climate governance, especially from the perspective of 
bottom-up climate regimes. BTAs would reduce the resistance of 
domestic industry to GHG regulation, allowing such regulation to be 
both stronger and more effectively enforced. By evening out import 
disparities, BTAs could also reduce the danger of carbon leakage. 
Additionally, the possibility of negotiated agreements with foreign states 
to mutually reduce GHG emissions would be enhanced by the addition of 
the carrot of BTA reductions (or the stick of BTAs remaining in 
place).
464
 The World Bank conservatively estimates that such BTAs 
“could result in a loss of about 7 percent in U.S. exports to the EU. The 
energy-intensive industries such as steel and cement, which are the most 
likely to be subject to these provisions and thus would be most affected, 
could suffer up to a 30 percent loss.”465 These kinds of trade impacts 
represent powerful incentives for free-riders to get on board with GHG 
reduction targets. 
In the first section of this analysis, I detailed three primary 
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objections to the use of BTAs for GHG regulation: (1) the need to 
conform with WTO rules; (2) the difficulty of designing efficient 
methodologies; and (3) the fact that BTAs are unilateral measures 
representing protectionist trade policies, and as such are destructive to 
coalition based solutions to global warming. These objections have, I 
hope, been adequately addressed above. But I will attempt a concise 
summary in the following paragraphs. 
1. BTAs have been used since the inception of GATT and will 
continue to be used to further a wide variety of policy goals well into the 
future. As detailed in the preceding sections, the intricacies of specific 
BTAs for GHG-based taxes and regulations have yet to become totally 
clear. But after parsing through much of the regulatory theory, case law, 
and international treaties that could impact the legality of such BTAs 
under the WTO, it seems clear that both the will and the means exist to 
institute such measures. Perhaps the better question is not whether a 
GHG-based BTA will be instituted, but how it can be designed so as to 
avoid numerous pitfalls. 
2. Ismer and Neuhoff‟s proposed model, as well as the other 
suggestions in Section III, presents a wide range of potential solutions to 
the second problem. Methodologies reliant on predominant product 
production processes and average GHG emissions seem equipped to 
cope with the unique complexities of product GHG quotients. There is 
ample flexibility under GATT to allow the use of estimates of the GHG 
content of individual classifications of products without running afoul of 
GATT anti-discrimination provisions. 
3. Environmentalism as a political ideology is more powerful today 
than ever before, and it has the potential to offset traditional game-theory 
cost/benefit thinking among consumers. If incentives were more 
balanced, consumers would tend to choose based on perceived 
environmental benefit. This may suggest inflated efficacy for BTA 
measures that level the playing field for domestic, low-carbon industry. 
Finally, BTAs present the means to bring non-compliant states into 
line with larger market actors, especially in the context of international 
negotiation theory and the example of the Montreal Protocol. From this 
angle, GHG-based BTAs would be used to impact the public-policy 
choices of other states, along the same lines as the measure at issue in 
Shrimp—Turtle. To that end, it is vital that issues like carbon leakage, 
political impacts, wealth distribution, and developing economy 
incentives to participate in a low-GHG world economy remain the 
central components of domestic GHG-reduction measures. 
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